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1.

INTRODUCTION

The literature on comparative law and public policy has long
portrayed the United States and Japan as having contrasting legal
styles. U.S. legal style, which Robert Kagan has labeled as "adversarial legalism," is characterized by complex rules, formal and adversarial procedures for resolving disputes, costly legal contestation involving many lawyers and frequent judicial intervention in
administrative affairs.' Japanese legal style, by contrast, has been
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I See Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad, Adversarial Legalism: An International
Perspective, in COMPARATIVE DISADVANTAGES?: SOCIAL REGULATIONS AND THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 146 (Pietro S. Nivola ed., 1997) (reviewing comparative studies
of United States legal/regulatory style); Robert A. Kagan, AdversarialLegalism and
American Government,10 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGmT 369, 371 (1991); Robert A. Kagan, American Lawyers, Legal Culture, and AdversarialLegalism, in LEGAL CULTURE &
THE LEGAL PROFESSION 7, 8-11 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds.,
1996) [hereinafter Kagan, American Lawyers] (discussing how the American legal
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characterized by informality, opacity, flexibility, cooperation between regulators and the regulated and little involvement of either
lawyers or courts. 2 Some commentators have even gone so far as
3
to question the extent to which Japan enjoys the rule of law at all.
More generally, scholars of comparative law and comparative
public policy have recently started to ask whether the American
regulatory or legal style may be spreading to other jurisdictions
around the world. These scholars have highlighted a number of
mechanisms that may encourage the spread of American legal
style, including economic liberalization, the globalization of markets, growing distrust of government bureaucrats, heightened judicial activism, demands for transparency, the globalization of U.S.
law firms and the international influence of American legal education.4 As in many debates surrounding the impact of globalization
process is characterized). Kagan uses the terms regulatory style and legal style
interchangeably when discussing American adversarial legalism. In discussing
the same phenomena, others refer to a distinctive American "mode of production
of law." See David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuringand the Law: Studies of the
Internationalizationof Legal Fields and the Creation of TransnationalArenas, 44 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 407,413 (1994).
2 See FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1987)
(examining myths and truths of the Japanese legal system); Robert A. Kagan,
Comparing National Styles of Regulation in Japan and the United States, 22 LAW &
POL'Y 225 (2000); Frank K. Upham, PrivatizedRegulation: Japanese Regulatory Style
in Comparative and International Perspective, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 396 (1996)
[hereinafter Upham, Privatized Regulation] (discussing how and by whom Japan is
governed).
3 See, e.g., JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER 143 (1991) ("What
makes the role of the bureaucracy distinctive in Japan is neither its influence nor
its size. It is instead the conjunction of broad, seemingly limitless authority without, however, even a relatively normal degree of coercive legal powers."); Eric C.
Sibbitt, Regulating Gambling in the Shadow of the Law: Form and Substance in the
Regulation of Japan's Pachinko Industry, 38 HARV. INT'L L.J. 568, 568-86 (1997) (discussing the quasi-legal status of the pachinko industry in Japan). Other scholars
have stressed the role of law as "an instrument of the government to govern"
rather than "an instrument for citizens to challenge the government or big business to solve disputes among them;" Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Judicial Reform in Japan: The Rule of Law at Last?, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 118 (2001). See
also id. (citing K6ji Sat6, Jiyfino H6 Chitsujo [Legal Order For Liberty], in 2 Kenp6
Gojinen no Tenb6 [2 The Prospect of The Constitutional Law at Its Fiftieth Anniversary], 1, 54-58 (K6ji, Sat6 et al. eds., 1999) (noting that Japan has had "rule by
law," not the "rule of law').
4 Some scholars have focused on the spread of American style adversarial
legalism.
See REGULATORY ENCOUNTERS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS &
AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM (Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad eds., 2000);
Lawrence M. Friedman, Are We a Litigious People?, in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE
LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 1, at 53; Marc Galanter, Law Abounding: Legalisation
Around the North Atlantic, 55 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Galanter, Law
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on national policy choices, the emerging debate over the globalization of law pits one group of scholars arguing that globalization
severely constrains national policy choices, against another group,
arguing that national governments are likely to maintain their distinctive national policies in the face of globalization pressures.
Some scholars have argued that legal styles are converging on an
American model 5 while others have argued that distinct national
legal styles are likely to persist.6 However, there has been little
sustained debate and little systematic empirical research on the issue of legal convergence. Moreover, the existing research remains
isolated from broader debates regarding globalization and policy
convergence.
This Article offers both theoretical and empirical contributions
to the debate regarding the globalization of law. Theoretically, we
show why the most common explanations for policy convergence
that focus on competitive pressures or policy emulation do not
provide a convincing account for the spread of American legal
style, and we offer an alternative explanation. We argue that the
spread of U.S. legal style results primarily not from economic
Abounding]; Marc Galanter, The Assault on Civil Justice: The Anti-Lawyer Dimension,
in LEGAL CULTURE & THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 1, at 79 [hereinafter Galanter, The Assault]; Kagan, American Lawyers, supra note 1; Robert A. Kagan, Should
Europe Worry About Adversarial Legalism?, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997)
[hereinafter Kagan, Should Europe Worry]; Kagan & Axelrad, supra note 1; Martin
Shapiro, The Globalizationof Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37 (1993), availableat
http://www.law.indiana.edu/glsj/voI1/toc.htn-l; Wolfgang Wiegand, Americanization of Law: Reception or Convergence?, in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 100 [hereinafter Wiegand, Americanization]; Wolfgang Wiegand, The
Reception ofAmerican Law in Europe, 39 AM. J. CoMP. L. 229 (1991) [hereinafter The
Reception]. Other scholars have focused specifically on the spread of judicial review, which they recognize as a practice most fully developed in the United
States. See ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES: CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
IN EUROPE (2000); THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (Neal C. Tate &
Torbj6m Vallinder eds., 1995); Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone, The New Constitutional Politics ofEurope, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 397 (1994).
5 See Yves Dezalay, Between the State, Law and the Market: The Social and Professional Stakes in the Construction and Definition of a Regulatory Arena, in
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON
ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 59 (William Bratton et

al. eds., 1996); Galanter, The Assault, supra note 4; Galanter, Law Abounding, supra
note 4; Shapiro, supra note 4; Trubek, supra note 1; Wiegand, The Americanization,
supra note 4; Wiegand, The Reception, supra note 4.
6 See Kagan, American Lawyers, supra note 1; Kagan, Should Europe Worry, supra note 4; Kagan & Axelrad, supra note 1; Frans van Waarden, Persistenceof National Policy Styles: A Study of Their InstitutionalFoundations, in CONVERGENCE OR
DIVERSITY? 333 (Brigitte Unger & Franz van Waarden eds., 1995).
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competition between governments or from emulation, but from
common responses by governments to similar economic, political
and social conditions. 7 We argue that two factors, economic liberalization and the fragmentation of political authority, are the primary drivers of the spread of American legal style. In addition, we
emphasize the role that the spread of U.S. law firms, itself a product of economic liberalization, plays in accelerating the process of
Americanization.
Empirically, we conduct a detailed study of the "Americanization" of Japanese legal style, examining general trends as well as
more specific developments in two particular areas of regulation:
securities and products liability. As noted above, Japan has a wellestablished legal style that differs dramatically from the American.
The roots of Japanese legal style are deeply imbedded in a variety
of political and social institutions, and one would expect Japanese
legal style to be particularly resistant to Americanization. Thus,
our findings concerning Japan are likely to lend insight into the
prospects of Americanization in other OECD (Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development) countries. In essence, if
Americanization of legal style can happen in such a "tough case"
as Japan, this suggests that Americanization in countries with less
divergent legal styles is quite plausible.
Measuring the globalization of American law presents numerous challenges. First, the concept of legal style is itself multifaceted, involving the way statutes and regulations are written, interpreted, applied and enforced, the role and use of lawyers to protect
client interests and the organization of the legal profession itself.
Certain aspects of a country's legal style may be Americanized,
while others remain unchanged. Further, while change may become immediately apparent where new laws are promulgated or
old ones are amended, changes in practice and the legal infrastructure may take longer to manifest themselves. Second, legal
style varies across areas of law within any country. Some areas of
law may be thoroughly Americanized, while others may go untouched. Finally, the factors that influence the spread of American
legal style may differ in various areas of law, such that no single
7 See generally Beth Simmons & Zachary Elkins, Globalization and Policy Diffusion: Explaining Three Decades of Liberalization, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL
ECONOMY: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN TRANSITION (Miles Kahler & David Lake eds.)
(forthcoming) (manuscript, on file with author) (making a similar distinction in
examining the diffusion of economic liberalization policies).
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explanation of legal globalization accounts for the entire phenomenon.
To address these measurement challenges, we supplement our
analyses of broad trends in legal style in Japan with detailed comparative case studies of two distinct areas of law: securities law
and product liability law. Securities law serves as an "easy case"
for our argument. Developments in securities law are likely to be
particularly influenced by the profound globalization of financial
markets, which is facilitated by economic liberalization. Moreover,
the financial services industry is highly internationalized and relies
heavily on the legal services of major U.S. transnational law firms. 8
Economic liberalization and political fragmentation also promote
Americanization in the products liability area. However, American law firms are not active in this area in Japan, and absent their
catalytic effect, we anticipate less Americanization in this area.
While space limitations prevent us from examining other areas of
law in as much detail, our discussion of general trends in legal
style includes discussion of developments in a number of policy
areas.
It may be the case that the globalization of American law is a
limited phenomenon, impacting only the most internationalized
areas of legal practice and of interest primarily to multinational
enterprises. However, we argue that the globalization of American
law is having a more profound effect, encouraging a transformation in patterns of interest group representation and policymaking
by replacing informal, opaque, consensual processes with formal,
transparent and adversarial ones. The normative implications of
such a transformation would be highly contested. Some observers
would applaud such changes, viewing them as enhancing transparency, openness, accountability, fairness and legal certainty.
Others, however, would view such a shift as the advent of costly
American-style hyper-legalization and litigation mania. Thus, depending on one's viewpoint, the globalization of American law
either may be seen as a salutary development, or as a form of legal
contagion-spreading the "American Disease" of excess lawyers
and litigation.9
8 See Roger J. Goebel, Professional Qualificationand EducationalRequirementsfor
Law Practice in a Foreign Country: Bridging the Cultural Gap, 63 TuL. L. REv. 443

(1939).

9 See Richard B. Stewart, Antidotesfor the "AmericanDisease," 20 ECOLOGY L.Q.
85 (1993) (discussing regulatory legalism as a distinctly "American Disease).
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The remainder of this Article is divided into four sections. Section 2 details our explanation for the globalization of American
law. Section 3 explores the notion of American legal style in more
detail and presents brief accounts of American legal style in the areas of securities regulation and products liability law. Section 4
examines the spread of American legal style to Japan, including
cases studies of products liability law and securities regulation.
Section 5 concludes with a discussion of the applicability of our
findings into other areas and of the prospects for continued globalization of American law.

2.

EXPLAINING THE GLOBALIZATION OF AMERICAN LAW

The most common explanations of global convergence of national policies do not provide an adequate explanation for the
globalization of American legal style. One common explanation
for convergence is the "race-to-the-bottom," or competition in laxity.10 The race-to-the-bottom logic suggests that exit-threats from
mobile targets of regulation (e.g., firms) pressure governments to
lower their regulatory standards. In other words, competition
between jurisdictions to attract and retain mobile targets of regulation leads governments to reduce the stringency of their regulations.
David Vogel has offered a contrasting explanation, arguing that
economic liberalization and regulatory competition may lead to a
"race-to-the-top," or competition in strictness." By this logic, if a
jurisdiction with a large market chooses to maintain strict regulatory standards and makes access to its market contingent on
meeting those standards, foreign producers who wish to access the
market will be pressured to adopt those standards. Once foreign
producers adjust to these higher standards, they will be more
willing to accept the introduction of these standards in their home
jurisdictions. They may even seek the introduction of these standards as a regulatory barrier against competitors, both domestic

10

See

REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE

(Daniel Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 2001); Daniel W. Drezner,
Globalization and Policy Convergence, 3 INT'L STUD. REV. 53 (2001); and Peter Swire,
The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability:Explaining Failures in Competition
Among Jurisdictionsin Environmental Law, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 67 (1996) for reviews
of the race-to-the-bottom literature.
11 See DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1995).
PERSPECTIVES
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and foreign, that currently do not meet those standards. Finally,
governments of jurisdictions with higher standards may pressure
governments of other jurisdictions to raise their standards, in order
to prevent them from deriving competitive benefits from their
12
regulatory laxity.
Neither of these forms of regulatory competition provides a
sufficient explanation for the globalization of American law. A
race-to-the-bottom explanation would require that foreign jurisdictions emulate U.S. style regulations in an effort to make themselves more attractive to mobile targets of regulation. This argument presumes that the United States has lower standards, which
is dearly not true in many areas. In securities law 3 and products
liability law, U.S. standards arguably impose higher costs on firms.
One would hardly expect foreign jurisdictions to emulate such
laws in an effort to compete for mobile targets of regulation. More
generally, many critics argue that American legal style is excessively costly, conflictual and slow, and look to Western Europe and
Japan for models of more cooperative, informal, inexpensive approaches to law and regulation. 14 Finally, while smaller or weaker
jurisdictions may intentionally lower their regulations to attract or
retain more mobile offshore tax avoiders, money launderers, or
manufacturers exploiting tax environmental or working conditions, advanced industrial economies with significant market
power do not generally lower their standards to compete with such
threats. 5

12 See Drezner, supra note 10, at 77 (discussing the use of economic coercion
as a tool to force others to conform to desired regulatory standards).
13 In fact, the New York and London markets have become the largest international securities markets despite having the most comprehensive securities
regulation systems in the world. See Manning Gilbert Warren Ill, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARV.

INT'L L.J. 185,189 (1990).
14 See Charles R. Epp, Do Lawyers Impair Economic Growth?, 17 LAW & Soc.
585 (1992) (disputing the theory that large lawyer populations impair
economic growth); Galanter, The Assault, supra note 4 (depicting the current negative view of the U.S. legal system and lawyers as the chief beneficiaries of that
system).
INQUIRY

15 The response of advanced industrial economies is generally not to lower
their own standards, but to expand the scope of their own laws and apply political and economic pressures on these jurisdictions, either unilaterally or in concert

with others states. For example, the OECD's Financial Action Task Force has been

actively blacklisting "non-cooperative jurisdictions" when it comes to money
laundering and financial crime. See Gareth Porter, Trade Competition and Pollution
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As for the race-to-the-top argument, non-U.S. firms forced to
meet U.S. legal or regulatory requirements stricter than those in
their home markets (e.g., disclosure requirements for offering securities) in order to access the U.S. market would probably find it
easier to adapt to the adoption of U.S. regulations at home. Because the incremental cost of domestic compliance for firms already complying with U.S. restrictions may be minimal, this dynamic may contribute to the foreign adoption of particular U.S.
laws or regulatory standards, for instance in some areas of securities regulation and environmental regulation. 16 However, there are
many policy areas, such as products liability, where such domestic
implementation would expose firms to additional costs and liabilities and would not generate a race-to-the-top dynamic. Generally
race-to-the-top dynamics are likely to be limited to standards concerning traded goods and services (where high standard states can
threaten to block market access) and are unlikely to influence more
general patterns of regulation and legal practice. 17 Therefore, the
race-to-the-top itself cannot explain adequately why a country's
regulatory style as a whole would change.
Finally, another set of explanations for policy convergence focuses on policy emulation among nations. These emulation arguments suggest that convergence may occur as governments model
their policies after those of salient global leaders or those advocated by international governmental organizations.' 8 While emulation of U.S. policies has certainly occurred in some policy areas,
emulation arguments do not provide a convincing explanation for
the spread of American legal style in a broad sense. First, even in
areas where emulation of American policies clearly occurred, the
shift toward American legal style was only made possible when
changes in the domestic political and economic factors discussed
below allowed policymakers in favor of Americanization to overcome opposition to such reforms. Second, while the U.S. laws and
legal practices have been viewed as pacesetters in a number of ar-

Standards: "Race to the Bottom" or "Stuck at the Bottom?," 8 J. ENvTL. DEv. 133 (1999);
VOGEL, supra note 11; Drezner, supra note 10.
16 See VOGEL, supra note 11; Beth A. Simmons, The InternationalPolitics of Harmonization: The Case of CapitalMarket Regulation, 55 INT'L ORG. 589 (2001).
17 On limits of race-to-the-top arguments, see Swire, supra note 10, at 85.
18 See MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

(Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1996); Drezner, supra note 10; John W. Meyer et al., World
Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J.Soc. 144 (1997).
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eas, governments across the OECD have been eager to avoid
adopting American legal style in a general sense. As noted above,
U.S. legal style has been viewed both inside and outside the United
States as excessively inflexible, adversarial and costly.19
We maintain that neither race-to-the-bottom nor race-to-the-top
regulatory competition between governments, nor policy emulation provide adequate explanations for the spread of American legal style. While race-to-the-top dynamics and emulation have
played a role in the adoption of some U.S.-style laws, these dynamics cannot explain the general shift to U.S. legal style across a
broad range of policy areas and cannot explain far-reaching
changes in legal practice. Rather, we argue that the shift toward
U.S. legal style is the product of similar, but primarily uncoordinated responses by governments to analogous economic, political
and social developments. Increasing economic liberalization, including the catalytic spread of U.S. law firms to foreign jurisdictions, and political fragmentation have been the primary forces encouraging the spread of U.S. legal style.
2.1. Economic Liberalization
Over the past twenty years, a wave of deregulation and trade
liberalization has swept across the OECD economies, opening international markets for capital, goods and services and instigating
far-reaching domestic reforms, such as privatization of stateowned enterprises and removal of price and entry controls. Examining the causes of this trend is beyond the scope of this Article,
and we take economic liberalization as an exogenous force (though
we draw particular attention below to explaining the spread of U.S.
law firms as an important component of this liberalization) that has
impacted national legal and regulatory systems across OECD
countries. Liberalization allows new actors, some of them foreign
actors, into previously dosed markets and allows both new and
existing actors to participate in new areas of economic activity
where markets were previously non-existent. The introduction of
newcomers and outsiders undermines informal systems of regulation based on insider networks and trust. Furthermore, where liberalization allows for the emergence of new markets, governments
19 Indeed, during the U.S. recession of the early 1990s, many critics contended that the inflexibility, stringency, and litigiousness characteristic of American legal style were to blame for America's lackluster economic performance. See
Warren, supra note 13.
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may not have established regulatory channels to implement their
regulatory objectives. When governments find that their closed,
informal, and opaque approaches to regulation have become unworkable, they seek other means by which to pursue their regulatory goals. Therefore, liberalization leads to more than simple deregulation; it also creates pressure for re-regulation to enable
government to maintain influence over economic actors in a liberalized environment.20 Given the distrust between actors in liberalized markets and the lack of close government/industry ties, new
laws and regulatory processes will tend to be more formal, legalistic, and transparent, at the same time creating greater demand for
lawyers to protect the interests of their clients through guidance,
advocacy and dispute resolution. 21 Economic liberalization commenced earlier in the United States than in most other OECD
economies. As other jurisdictions liberalize, they subject themselves to many of the same economic conditions that stimulated
the emergence of a formal, transparent, and adversarial legal style
in the United States years earlier.
2.2. American Law Firms
As a result of economic liberalization, the influence of American corporate law firms, particularly their entry into foreign jurisdictions, plays an important role in accelerating the process of
Americanization. Opening up markets for legal services introduces a degree of competition to an area of economic activity,
which in most jurisdictions is shielded from free competition by
the restriction of legal practice to a cartel of licensed professionals.
Economic liberalization also stimulates greater transnational activity and, hence, demand for cross-border legal services. When
American law firms enter foreign markets to service multinational
clients or in search of new clients, they bring with them American
lawyers, legal practices, and forms of law firm organization. Their
experience with adversarial legalism and their expertise in megalawyering techniques, including complex multi-jurisdictional litigation, the drafting of contracts suited to liberalized markets, and
20 MICHAEL MORAN, THE POLITICS OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES REVOLUTION 88-

119 (1991); STEVEN K. VOGEL, FREER MARKETS, MORE RULES: REGULATORY REFORM IN
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 3 (Peter Katzenstein ed., 1996).
21 As Kagan notes, this notion parallels Donald Black's thesis that legalization
increases as the social distance between parties increases. DONALD BLACK, THE
BEHAVIOR OF LAW 131 (1976).
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lobbying, prove, in a liberalized environment, to be distinct advantages vis-A-vis foreign competitors unfamiliar with this type or
scale of practice. Moreover, their size enables them to provide a
full range of legal services and an array of legal specialists that
smaller local law firms cannot match. The influx of American law
firms into foreign legal markets introduces a competitive dynamic
that pressures local law firms to reorganize along the lines of
American law firms or to join them. Through interaction with the
domestic bar, U.S. lawyers provide examples of U.S. solutions to
re-regulation and advocate for deregulation/re-regulation along
U.S. lines. As the structure and practices of foreign law firms begin
to resemble their American counterparts in important respects
(most notable are the U.K. firms in the past decade or so),22 the
spread of U.S. legal style accelerates.
2.3. PoliticalFragmentation
Systems of informal regulation depend on political leaders (the
principals) delegating extensive discretion to the regulatory bureaucracy and/or to private self-regulatory bodies (the agents).
This approach is most likely to be found in political systems where
political authority is concentrated in the hands of a small number
of like-minded veto players2 3 Where political authority is concentrated, political leaders need not resort to codified, inflexible, legalistic means to control their regulatory bureaucracy and achieve
their regulatory aims. Instead, they can establish less formal incentive structures, backed by monitoring mechanisms that encourage the bureaucracy to pursue their goals faithfully.24 If political
leaders are unhappy with actions undertaken by the bureaucracy,
they can readily reign them in. Moreover, where political author22 For example, Clifford Chance, a U.K. firm that merged in January 2000
with Rogers & Wells of the United States, is now the largest law firm in the world,
despite being the product of a 1987 merger of two mid-tier law firms that were not
part of the elite "Magic Circle" of the United Kingdom's top five firms.
23 George Tsebelis, Decision Making in PoliticalSystems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism,Multicameralism and Multipartyism, 25 BRIT. J. POL. Sci.
289 (1995) (explaining that the degree to which power is concentrated in a political
system can best be measured by examining the number of "veto players" (i.e., actors who have the power to veto new legislation) in the system and the political
distance between the veto players. As the number of veto players increases
and/or political distance between them increases, political fragmentation increases).
24 See J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN'S POLITICAL

MARKETPLACE

107-19 (1993).
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ity is concentrated, courts tend to play a weak role in oversight of
the bureaucracy; therefore recourse to judicialization as a means of
controlling the bureaucracy would be futile. 25
By contrast, as political authority becomes more fragmented,
judicialization becomes a more attractive means for political principals to control bureaucratic agents. As the fragmentation of political authority increases (i.e., as the number of veto players increases), assembling the political coalitions necessary to reign in
the bureaucracy (i.e., to pass new legislation) becomes more difficult. Recognizing the likelihood of political gridlock and the durability of legislation, lawmakers have an incentive to draft legislation in a manner that will insulate their regulatory policies against
potential manipulation by the bureaucracy ("bureaucratic drift") or
by political forces that may come to power in the future ("political
drift"). 26 Lawmakers also recognize that the fragmentation of
power insulates the judiciary against easy legislative overrides and
other forms of political backlash, and that courts may, therefore, be
willing to play an active role in challenging executive actions and
constraining executive discretion. 27 Lawmakers draft statutes that
specify in great detail the goals that bureaucratic agencies must
achieve, the deadlines they must meet, and the administrative procedures they must follow. They provide for extensive judicial review, assuring that their allies will have access to the courts to hold
the executive accountable. 28 When lawmakers rely on such a judicialization strategy as a means to control the bureaucracy, they encourage the development of an inflexible, adversarial and litigious
25 See Terry Moe & Michael Caldwell, The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and ParliamentarySystems, 150 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 171 (1994). On the role of courts in concentrated power systems, see MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND
POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981); John Ferejohn, Law, Legislationand Positive PoliticalTheory, in MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY: OLD TOPIcS, NEW DIRECTIONS 191 (Jeffrey S.
Banks & Eric A. Hanushek eds., 1995); and Robert D. Cooter & Tom Ginsburg,
Comparative Judicial Discretion:An Empirical Test of Economic Models, 16 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 295 (1996).
26 MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 14-19
(1995); McNollgast, The Political Origins of the Administrative ProcedureAct, 15 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 180 (1999); Terry M. Moe, Politics and the Theory of Organization,7
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 106,106-29 (1991).
27 See Ramseyer & Rosenbluth, supra note 24, at 142-61.
28 See supra note 25; Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Matthew D.
McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control ofAgencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431 (1989).
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approach to the implementation and enforcement of regulatory
policy.
Finally, fragmentation of political authority also encourages
adversarial legalism by creating multiple openings through which
interest groups can access political power. The existence of multiple access points encourages groups to engage in a form of political
forum shopping.29 If one political authority does not accede to
their demands, they need not necessarily reach a negotiated compromise; instead, they can readily shift their efforts to another
source of political or judicial authority. Thus, the fragmentation of
political authority encourages interest groups and other societal
actors to engage in complex, multi-pronged lobbying and litigation
strategies.
The institutional structure of the U.S. government was explicitly designed to fragment political power. The highly fragmented
U.S. system, which combines separation of powers, bicameralism
and federalism, has encouraged the development of adversarial legalism. While the degree of fragmentation of power varies considerably across advanced industrial economies, we expect that increases in the degree of political fragmentation encourage shifts
from opaque, flexible, informal approaches to regulatory policy to
more transparent, inflexible, formal and adversarial approaches,
resembling the American model.
Taken together, economic liberalization (including the resulting
spread of U.S. law firms) and political fragmentation explain the
globalization of American law. While a host of other factors have
certainly played a role in some issue areas, we maintain that the
confluence of these two factors are primarily responsible for the
shift toward U.S. legal style across a range of policy areas.
3.

AMERICAN LEGAL STYLE

The United States has a distinctive legal style. While legal style
varies across areas of law in the United States, some patterns are
common across a wide range of legal fields. Much of the distinctiveness of U.S. legal style30 is well-captured by Kagan's notion of
29 R. Kent Weaver & Bert A. Rockman, When and How Do Institutions Matter?,
in Do INSTITUTIONS MATTER? GovERNMENT CAPABIITES IN THE UNITED STATES AND
ABROAD 445-61 (R. Kent Weaver & Bert A. Rockman eds., 1993).
30 Other analysts examining similar issues use terms other than "legal style."
For instance, Trubek, supra note 1, at 413, refer to the distinctive American "mode
of production of law."
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"adversarial legalism." According to Kagan, cross-national comparisons reveal that U.S. legal style is characterized by
more complex and detailed bodies of rules; more frequent
recourse to formal legal methods of implementing policy
and resolving disputes; more adversarial and expensive
forms of legal contestation; more punitive legal sanctions
(including larger civil damage awards); more frequent judicial review, revision, and delay of administrative decision
making; and more malleability and unpredictability. 31
While Kagan's characterization captures essential features of
American legal style, we emphasize two additional features. First,
the broad range of regulatory guidance and advocacy services that
law firms provide and the pattern of organization of the American
legal services industry are central aspects of American legal style.
Second, while critics often focus on excessive litigation as the central feature of American legal style, we find that in many areas of
law the promotion of transparency and disclosure plays a more
central role than litigation. This promotion of transparency and
disclosure is further reinforced by the formal privatization of
regulatory enforcement through the creation of enforcement incentives in the form of statutory causes of action and litigation devices such as the class action lawsuit, derivative suits, and liberal
discovery rules.
3.1. Organizationof U.S. Legal Services Industnj and Range of
Services.
The organization of the U.S. legal services industry has long
differed from that in most other countries. Large corporate law
firms first emerged in the United States at the turn of the twentieth
Century, first in New York and later in other large cities in the
United States, with a few firms maintaining small offices in
Europe.32 The pace of growth of large U.S. firms increased dramatically from the 1960s, as firms not only added more lawyers
and support staff, but spread their operations to branch offices

31 Kagan & Axelrad, supra note 1, at 150.
32 MARc GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY,
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW
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across the United States and the world.33 By contrast, Japanese
firms and European firms, with the notable exception of U.K. firms
in the past decade, have remained small by American standards.
In 2001, of the top 100 international firms in terms of total revenue
in the world, eighty-eight were U.S.-based. The remainder were
from the common law jurisdictions of the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada. Of the top ninety-nine, U.S. firms occupied
eighty-three spots in terms of profits per partner and sixty-five in
terms of total number of lawyers, with U.K., Australian and Canadian firms occupying the remaining positions. 34
Along with expanding their size and geographic scope, American law firms expanded the range of services they provided and
developed internal divisions of labor, establishing departments
specializing in various areas of law. While their European and
Japanese counterparts tended to maintain more distance in their
practices from the world of commerce and politics, U.S. firms became intimately involved in both. American corporate law firms
began to play a direct and far-reaching role in dealmaking and
corporate strategy. American firms also began to provide a wide
range of policy advocacy services, representing clients in legislative and administrative fora, as well as in courtrooms and corporate boardrooms. Employing what Galanter calls "mega-lawyering
techniques," they advocate for their clients using multi-pronged
strategies, preparing drafts of legislation and administrative rules
and lobbying for their adoption, negotiating with regulators, and
pursuing litigation in multiple fora.35 These strategies have been
emulated outside the world of corporate law as well; publicinterest law firms, for instance, that provide a similar range of political advocacy services for the causes they serve.36 In short, law
firms serve as important general agents of interest representation
and advocacy.

33 For many of the largest U.S. corporate law firms, half their revenues are
from foreign clients in the United States or from American or foreign clients overseas, and the percentage is said to be increasing. At least twenty American firms
now have ten percent of their lawyers stationed overseas. See Alison Frankel, Who
Is Going Global?, AM. LAW., Nov. 2001, at 79.
34 See The Global 100, AM. LAW., Nov. 2001, at 87.
35 See Galanter, Law Abounding, supra note 4, at 4-5.
36 Id.; GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 32, at 18.
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3.2. Emphasis on TransparencyDisclosureand Privatizationof
Incentives for Enforcement
Finally, an overemphasis on litigation seriously misrepresents
the nature of the U.S. legal style. It is the demand for transparency
and disclosure, detailed codification, and strict adherence to formal
rules and procedures that most distinguishes American legal style.
Government regulators certainly prosecute and sue offenders to
promote the public good, but the primary demands they place on
the regulated involve adherence to detailed, codified, transparent
procedures. Moreover, promotion of transparency and disclosure
is effectively privatized in a number of areas by creating private
economic incentives for enforcement through statutory claims relating to disclosure-related failings. In relationships between businesses, American lawyers tend to produce long, complex contracts
designed to cover all contingencies. 37 The threat of litigation certainly casts a shadow over much legal work done in the United
States, particularly in areas of tort law, but for most of the largest
U.S. law firms litigation work is less significant than general corporate work.
3.2.1.

Securities Law

All modem industrial economies regulate financial markets in
order to promote efficient capital allocation, investor protection,
market stability and other regulatory goals. Financial markets may
be roughly divided into indirect financing (borrowing from banks)
and direct financing (raising money through offerings of debt or
equity securities), a division that has been reinforced in markets
such as the United States and Japan through a regulatory division
between banking and the securities business.3 8 We focus on the

37 See Martin Shapiro, Globalization of Freedom of Contract, in THE STATE AND
FREEDOM OF CONTRAcT 269-98 (Scheiber ed., 1998); Richard C. Breedan, The Globalization of Law and Business in the 1990s, 28 WAKE FORESr L. REv. 509, 516 (1993)
(describing the American standards of disclosure); Goebel, supra note 8, at 449
(depicting Wall Street law firms' contracts as complex, elaborate, and highly pro-

tective).
38 In Europe where so-called "universal banking" exists, financial institutions
have been permitted to more directly engage in both the securities and banking
businesses. This regulatory distinction has been reduced through the watering
down and eventual elimination of the Glass-Steagall division in the United States
and the loosening of the Article 65 "one-set" regulatory structure in Japan. See
James R. Barth et al., The Repeal of Glass Steagall and the Advent of Broad Banking,
(Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, E&PA Working Paper 2000-5, 2000),

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss2/3

2002]

AMERICANIZATION OFJAPANESE LAW

regulation of direct financing, specifically regulation of the public
securities markets. As a comprehensive analysis of even only the
regulation of the public securities markets is beyond the scope of
this paper, we emphasize only the basic approach toward the
regulation of the public securities markets.
Federal regulation of securities in the United States began with
the enactment of the Securities Act of 1933 (the "33 Act") and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "34 Act"), which collectively
form the basic statutory foundation for the regulation of securities
in the United States. 39 The hallmarks of U.S. securities regulation
are (i) a focus on regulating only the quality of mandatory disclosure of issuers, not the quality of the investments themselves or the
range of permissible investments, (ii) a high degree of transparency
in the regulatory process itself, and (iii) a strong emphasis on private enforcement, through both self regulatory organizations and
antifraud litigation by private parties.
3.2.1.1.

Disclosure

The 33 and 34 Acts represent somewhat of a middle course
between the conflicting philosophical approaches toward the
regulation of securities that had been adopted by different U.S.
states at the time of its enactment. One approach was laissez-faire,
requiring no disclosure but providing penal sanctions for committing fraud. At the other end of the spectrum were proponents of
the philosophy underlying many state "Blue Sky" laws, which included disclosure requirements and "merit" standards empowering regulators with the discretion to judge which companies
passed muster to offer their securities to the public. 40

available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/wp2OOO-5.htm. In addition, new financial
products increasingly blur the distinction in all markets. For example, banks may
issue securities in order to make loans, and securities firms may help banks securitize loan portfolios.
39 The 33 and 34 Acts followed a multitude of varying state regulatory regimes, "Blue Sky" laws, and several centuries of legislation in England. See, e.g.,
Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SEcuRrrrs REGULATION 3-6 (3d ed. 1998) (describing
the disclosure requirements of the 33 and 34 Acts).
40 In fact, the original 1933 bills provided for revocation of registration upon
an administrative finding (among other standards) that "the enterprise or business of the issuer.., or the security is not based upon sound principles, and that
the revocation is in the interest of the public welfare," or that the issuer "is in any
other way dishonest" or "in unsound condition or insolvent" Id. at 170. A minority of U.S. state laws have merit regulation systems to varying degrees, though
marketplace exemptions under the state law and federal preemption, pursuant to
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The middle course ultimately adopted went beyond the laissezfaire approach by statutorily mandating comprehensive disclosure
but not imposing merit standards. The philosophy behind this approach was well-articulated by Justice Louis Brandeis, who noted,
"Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman." 41 The drafters refused, however, to involve the government in passing judgment upon the merits of any
particular investment. As a drafter of the bill, Felix Frankfurter,
explained in 1933, "the Federal Securities Act does not place the
government's imprimatur upon securities. It is designed merely to
secure essential facts for the investor, not to substitute the government's judgment for its own." 42 U.S. securities regulators are not
concerned with the quality of the companies they review; rather,
they regulate the quality of the disclosure.
The 33 Act and 34 Act outline the disclosure regime for issuers,
including mandatory disclosure for offerings of securities and continuous quarterly, annual, and special event reporting for public
issuers. A detailed body of written regulation provides further
guidance. The SEC actively takes steps to promote quality disclosure. It reviews registration statements, financial statements and,
selectively, other reporting, often making several rounds of comments requiring further disclosures, clarifications, or representations by the issuer or independent professionals such as accountants or underwriters working for an issuer. The SEC also actively
takes both formal and informal actions to remedy or discipline disclosure-related failings.
3.2.1.2.

Transparency

Just as U.S. regulators have focused on the primacy of disclosure by issuers, they have largely "practiced what they preach" by
regulating in a manner that is generally quite transparent. In addition to promulgating detailed, written regulation, the process of
rulemaking itself is quite public. Newly proposed rules or
amendments (and for more complicated or novel rules, "concept
releases" articulating a proposed regulatory direction before forthe National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, have limited their
scope for listed companies.
41 Id. at 171 (citing LouIs D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY: AND How THE
BANKERS USE IT (1914)).
42 CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE & THE
SECuRITIES LAWS

6 (2d ed. 1997).
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mulation of a specific rule) are publicly disclosed, and public
commentary is invited. The SEC usually receives extensive comment letters from industry, law firms, and public interest groups.
It then summarizes the views expressed in the letters, often making
changes reflecting some of the comments and explaining the reasoning behind its chosen course of action. This contrasts with
regulatory approaches traditionally applied in other jurisdictions,
where authorities may consult informally with a limited number of
experts or industry participants before enacting a formal or informal rule.
Further, the process of regulatory guidance is relatively transparent. For example, "no-action letters," letters usually drafted by
attorneys on behalf of a private party unsure of how to interpret a
particular statutory provision or regulation, typically outline a fact
scenario, set out the relevant legal and regulatory background, and
request that that no regulatory or enforcement action be taken if a
particular course of action is followed by the requesting party. In
responding to a no-action letter request, the SEC may seek further
clarification, refuse to confirm that no action would be taken, or
state that, based on the facts in the letter, the SEC would not take
any action. The letters and SEC responses are published, unless
the requesting party withdraws the letter in anticipation of rejection, and are used as guidance by other practitioners confronting
similar situations. This contrasts with the practice of other jurisdictions where, if such guidance is provided, it is likely to be informal, oral, and non-public. Moreover, the SEC even publishes
the Manual of Publicly Available Telephone Interpretations, which
documents numerous SEC responses to informal questions posed
in telephone consultations with the SEC.
While the SEC uses both private and public administrative
guidance43 in enforcement, the SEC actively uses its more transparent formal enforcement powers under the 33 Act and 34 Act to
sanction violators with injunctions, monetary fines, and imprisonment. In 1999, for example, the SEC initiated 525 enforcement ac43 Although administrative guidance often carries a connotation of administrative coercion behind closed doors, this is not necessarily so. For example, Arthur Levitt, formerly Chairman of the SEC, in his campaign to improve the quality
of auditing, applied a tremendous amount of pressure on audit firms through cajoling speechmaking, including his famous "Numbers Game" speech, and the
very public threat of stricter regulation. See Chairman Arthur Levitt, The "Numbers Game," Remarks on Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 28, 1998) at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014

U. Pa.J. Intl Econ. L.

[23:2

tions, obtained orders in SEC judicial and administrative proceedings requiring securities law violators to disgorge illegal profits of
approximately $650 million, ordered civil penalties in SEC proceedings totaling more than $191 million, and obtained sixty-four
indictments or information and sixty-two convictions. 44
3.2.1.3.

Privatizationof Enforcement

The degree to which securities regulation has been formally
privatized is one of the most distinctive characteristics of U.S. securities regulation. While the SEC plays an active role in enforcing
disclosure obligations, incentives for enforcement have largely
been privatized. The statutes governing securities regulation encourage the privatization of enforcement through (i) selfregulatory organizations and (ii) civil liability. While both selfregulatory organizations and the SEC play important roles in securities regulation, it is the threat of private litigation that creates the
most powerful incentive for compliance.
The 34 Act provides for self-regulatory organizations ("SROs"),
to which substantial rulemaking and enforcement power is delegated. The SEC oversees SROs with the power to intervene in the
rulemaking process or the threat of regulating directly if the SROs
rules are deemed inadequate. The SROs most active in regulating
securities are the National Association of Securities Dealers
("NASD") and the stock exchanges themselves. Stock markets
such as the New York Stock Exchange and the Nasdaq market are
authorized by the SEC and subject to regulatory guidance, but the
exchanges largely decide their own rules in a competitive environment.
Generally, the threat of potential private litigation drives corporate disclosure more than the threat of enforcement action by the
SEC or the rules of SROs. The 33 Act and 34 Act contain a number
of provisions for liability, but the most important rules providing
redress are Rule 10b-5 under the 34 Act, a general antifraud provision, and Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 33 Act. Recovery can be
had under these provisions against underwriters, accountants, directors and officers, lawyers, and other experts named in the registration statement for material misstatements or omissions and
other violations.
44 1999 SEC ANN. REP., available at http://www.sec.gov/pf/annrep99/ar99
full.pdf.
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The 33 Act and 34 Act require issuers to have their financial
statements audited by independent public accountants, and issuers
and underwriters need lawyers to guide them through the regulatory landscape. While such professionals have important incentives to maintain their reputations, it is the background threat of
enforcement actions or litigation that ultimately puts teeth behind
compliance efforts. While there may be concern of enforcement by
the SEC, including criminal sanctions, the much larger threat arises
from private actors. Liability provisions such as Rule 10b-5 and
Section 11, in conjunction with litigation devices such as the class
action lawsuit or shareholders derivative suit, have given rise to an
industry of securities plaintiffs' lawyers who profit by uncovering
potential disclosure failings. Concern over the perceived excesses
of such litigation led Congress to enact reform legislation in 1995;
however, private litigation remains a potent tool of enforcement. 4
In 2000 and 2001, there were 216 and 487 issuers named in securities class action lawsuits, respectively. 46 The four largest settlement
awards range from $259 million to $3.527 billion. 47 Underwriters
hire lawyers in part to establish a "due diligence" defense against
litigation and to get a clean opinion from them. Accountants'
opinions on the quality of the financial statements are statutorily
required. Part of the leverage these professionals may exercise in
forcing disclosure by reluctant issuers and underwriters is the need
to protect against the threat of litigation from investors and plaintiffs' attorneys.
3.2.2.

Products Liabilihy Law

For many critics, products liability law is the bite noire of
American legal style, characterized by ambulance-chasing lawyers,
frivolous claims, sky-high punitive damage awards and a general
threat to the competitiveness of American industry. Critics argue
that products liability law has spawned a litigation industry that
serves the interests of trial lawyers more than those of injured con-

45 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat 3227 (1998); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No.
104-47,109 Stat 737 (1995).
46 Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, at http://
securities.stanford.edu (last modified Feb. 11, 2002). The increase in suits in 2001
was due in part to the proliferation of "IPO allocation" lawsuits.
47 Id.
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sumers.48 While there is hyperbole in some such images, they do
capture distinctive attributes of America's products liability regime. The U.S. system relies heavily on decentralized enforcement
by private litigants to identify defective products and to punish
their manufacturers and sellers. While a variety of product safety
and disclosure standards, enforced by a number of federal regulatory agencies, play an important role in protecting consumers from
unsafe products, these controls are backed by the threat of products liability litigation-against which regulatory compliance is
generally no defense. The threat of heavy punitive damages is
thought to deter manufacturers from marketing dangerous products in the first place. Permissive pre-trial discovery provisions,
the availability of contingency fee arrangements and class-actions,
the awarding of punitive damages, and the role of juries in determining damages all play central roles in American products liability law. Together, these legal institutions have encouraged an adversarial, litigious, and highly unpredictable approach to products

liability.
There is no general federal products liability law in the United
States. 49 Efforts to enact federal statutes governing products liability law have failed, and products liability has remained a matter of
state law, generated primarily through the case law of state courts
and occasionally through state statutes. While academic projects
such as the American Law Institute's ("ALl") Restatement (Second)
of Torts, Section 402A, and later, the Restatement (Third) of Torts
identify common principles emerging from the common law and
legal literature and help to promote the general acceptance of these
principles, state laws diverge in important ways. Some states have
enacted statutes limiting punitive damages, non-economic damages, joint-and-several liability, and establishing statutes of limitation, while others have not.

48 See Mike France,

The Litigation Machine, Bus. WK., Jan. 29, 2001, at 114 (dis-

cussing the power of the plaintiffs bar in tort law and the push for tort reform).
49 The only federal products liability laws concern specific products. For instance, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 establishes special liability rules concerning injuries caused by childhood vaccines. See Thomas

Lundmark, The Restatement (Third) and the European Product Liability Directive, 5
DETROIT C. L. J. INT'L L. 239, 267-68 (1996). Also, the General Aviation Revitaliza-

tion Act of 1994 (49 U.S.C. § 40,101) establishes an eighteen year time limit on liability claims.
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In the 1960s, strict liability emerged as the dominant doctrine in
products liability case law.5 0 The emergence of strict liability eased
the burden of proof for injured consumers. Under strict liability,
the plaintiff only needs to prove that a "defective" product caused
the harm; proof of negligence on the part of the manufacturer is
unnecessary. Proponents of strict liability argue that strict liability
helps consumers secure justice in the face of otherwise inferior
bargaining power, places the burden of harm on parties most able
to prevent and spread the cost of the harm (e.g., through insurance
or price increases) 5 ' and, as a result, helps to encourage manufacturers to make safer products.
Most U.S. jurisdictions place liability for harm caused by defective products on all "sellers." This means that not only manufacturers, but retailers and other middlemen in the chain of distribution of the product can be held liable. Consumers can rely on
the principle of joint-and-several liability to seek to recover damages from any of the "sellers" (i.e., manufacturers, distributors, retailers) involved in the chain of supply. Except in states that have
adopted relevant statutes of limitation, consumers are free to bring
products liability cases years or potentially decades after purchasing a product.52
Central to the practice of products liability law is the notion of
a "defective" product. Generally, a product may be defective because it is designed improperly, manufactured improperly, or
contains inadequate warnings. American lawyers actively review
product warnings (which must also address reasonable misuse) to
reduce the risk of a defect through adequate disclosure. While
many courts have allowed manufacturers to rely on a state-of-theart defense, shielding them against liability for "scientifically unknowable risks," some courts have held that manufacturers may be
liable for "scientifically unknowable risks."5 3 Products liability
claims may also be made on a variety of other grounds including
50 The doctrine was included in the RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS, § 402(A)
(1965). A 1962 California Supreme Court decision, Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prod., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal.1962), is a particularly important precedent
51 See Andrew Spacone, Strict Liability in the European Union - Not a United
States Analog, 5 ROGER WILUAMS U. L. REV. 342 (2000).
52 The only general exception is for the aerospace sector. Id.
53 Under the ALI's Third Restatement, the state-of-the-art defense may be
admitted but is not dispositive. Susan H. Easton, Note, The Pathfor Japan? An Examination of ProductLiability Laws in the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan,
23 B.C. INT'L & COMe. L. REv. 311,327 (2000).
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negligence, intentional tort, implied warranties of merchantability,
and fitness and representation theories.
Perhaps the most distinctive feature of the American products
liability regime is the size of damage awards. In addition to winning compensation for material damages (physical harm to person
or property), American plaintiffs can make claims for non-material
damages, such as psychological pain and suffering and for punitive damages. While some states have enacted statutory limits on
damage awards, most have not, and sympathetic juries continue
to award plaintiffs with huge punitive damages aimed at punishing errant companies. In2000, the median products liability award
against businesses was $1.8 million and there were twenty-seven
awards in excess of $100 million.55
When we couple these aspects of U.S. products liability law
with other aspects of legal practice, such as the availability of contingency fee arrangements, class actions, extensive pre-trial discovery requirements, and jury trials, a comprehensive picture comes
together. Contingency fee arrangements lower costs for litigants
(as they are essentially being financed by the plaintiff's attorneys);
strict liability lowers the burden of proof, hence increasing the
likelihood of payoff; joint-and-several liability allows plaintiffs to
focus on the most appealing or "deep-pocketed" targets; liberal
pre-trial discovery gives plaintiffs access to potential "smoking
guns," increasing the likelihood of success; class actions facilitate
cost-sharing; and juries tend to award generous damages. Together such factors explain the robustness of the products liability
litigation industry spawned by the U.S. legal system.

4. AMERICANIZATION OF LAW IN JAPAN
4.1. JapaneseLegal Stifle
The current wave of Americanization of Japanese law is not the
first instance in which the Japanese legal system has been significantly influenced by the law of a foreign jurisdiction. During the
Meiji Era, the Japanese government revolutionized their existing
feudal legal system by importing civil, commercial and adminis-

54
55

Lundmark, supra note 49, at 260-62.
The People v. America Inc., ECONOMIST, Mar. 24,2001, at 71.
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trative codes modeled on the German and French systems.56 During the American occupation following WWII, Japan adopted an
American style constitution with an emphasis on individual rights,
along with a host of new regulatory laws modeled after American
laws. Nevertheless, the Japanese legal style maintained a number
of distinctive attributes.
In the post-World War HI era, Japan has relied heavily on an informal regulatory style, in which government bureaucrats use informal "administrative guidance" (gyosei shido) to steer the affairs
of firms and pursue their regulatory goals.5 7 Compliance with this
guidance is, in principle, voluntary. In practice, bureaucrats have a

number of tools to compel firms to comply to varying degrees.
Highly conservative Japanese judges, themselves career bureau-

crats of the Ministry of Justice, have facilitated these informal, nontransparent practices by granting government ministries broad dis-

cretion.58 An informal variety of "privatized regulation"5 9 is another aspect of legal informality in Japan. n many areas, government bureaucrats have allowed relevant industries to informally
bargain over regulatory policies, while restricting public involvement. These informal regulatory practices were bolstered by the
close ties within the "Iron Triangle," comprised of the Liberal
Democratic Party ("LDP"), the bureaucracy and business. The importance for businesses of maintaining relationships with the bureaucracy was such that in a number of industries, elite track employees were assigned the task of cultivating personal relations
with government officials in order to access information and seek
favors.60 Ties between bureaucrats and the industries they regu56

Percy R. Luney, Jr., Traditions and Foreign Influences: Systems of Law in China

and Japan, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129,148-49 (1989). The American legal sys-

tem was also studied but was rejected.
57 See Ken Duck, Now That the Fog Has Lifted: The Impact of Japan'sAdministrative ProceduresLaw on the Regulation ofIndustry and Market Governance,19 FORDHAM
INT'L L. J. 1686 (1996); Upham, PrivatizedRegulation, supra note 2, at 425.
53 See, e.g., Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative Control of JapaneseJudges, in LAW
AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY 263 (Phillip S.C. Lewis ed., 1994)
(discussing the administrative mechanisms in Japan); Masaki Abe, The Internal
Control of a BureaucraticJudiciary: The Case of Japan, 23 INT'L J. Soc. L. 303 (1995)
(describing the bureaucratic nature of the Japanese judiciary); ; J.Mark Ramseyer,
The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. L. STUD. 721
(1994); Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, supra note 24.
59 Upham, PrivatizedRegulation,supra note 2.
60 In the finance industry, the phrase "MOF-tan" (meaning brokers as intermediaries) was even coined for these employees. See Duck, supranote 57.
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lated were further enhanced by the practice of amakudari ("descent
from heaven"), through which retired career bureaucrats were
given lucrative senior positions in regulated industries, as well as
by extravagant entertaining of bureaucrats by businesses.61 Politically protected "special corporations," government controlled
semi-public corporations heavily subsidized by the government,
provide bureaucrats with an additional retirement option. Ties
between business and politicians were strengthened by both legitimate donations and bribes, evident in the number of high-level
scandals that have come to light in the postwar period. 62
Political leaders and bureaucrats have traditionally focused on
pleasing their business constituencies at the expense of diffuse interests such as consumer or environmental protection, a focus
which has been reinforced by multimember electoral districts that
promote catering by politicians to narrow interest groups. Consistent with the interests of most businesses, political leaders have
consistently sought to discourage litigation and to channel policy
disputes away from courtrooms and into informal, nontransparent bureaucratic settings. 63 They have done so through a
variety of means. Most notably, the government has discouraged
litigation by limiting the number of, and hence access to, lawyers
in Japan. Even after years of incremental increases, each year only
approximately 1000 students pass the entrance exam for the Supreme Court's Legal Research and Training Institute, which, with
the exception of certain law professors, one must attend in order to
become a lawyer (bengoshi), including judges, public prosecutors,
public defenders, and private practitioners. 64 As of January 1, 2002,
there were 18,917 lawyers admitted to practice Japanese law in Ja-

61 For a description of one of the more notorious bureaucrat entertainment
scandals, see infra note 107 and accompanying text
62 Major postwar scandals implicating high-level politicians include the 1976
Lockheed Scandal that forced Tanaka Kakuei's removal from office, the 1988 Recruit Scandal that forced Takeshita Noboru's resignation and the 1992 Sagawa
Kyubin Scandal that led to the resignation of Kanemaru Shin, one of the LDP's
chief postwar power brokers.
63 See John Owen Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD.
2 (1978); Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLuM. L. REV. 923

(1984).
64 IVAN P. HALL, CARTELS OF THE MIND: JAPAN'S INTELLECTUAL CLOSED SHOP 21
(1998). By comparison, 7000 graduates pass the Bar in the Philippines each year.
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pan; less than one lawyer for every 7000 residents. 65 By comparison, the ratio in the United States in 2000 was approximately one
lawyer per 300 residents. 66 Even if one adds the separate professions of tax attorney (zeiri-shz), patent attorney (benri-shi), and the
paralegal professions in Japan (i.e., judicial scriveners (shiho shoshi),
and administrative scriveners (gy6sei shoshi)), the total number of
legal service providers remains extremely low by comparison with
the United States. 67 Access to lawyers has been restricted by the
limited number of lawyers and resulting high fees, back-logs on
court dockets as a result of inadequate appropriations to fund the
judicial system, high court filing fees, the absence of contingency
fee arrangements, and procedural rules such as restrictive standing
requirements and limited pre-trial discovery. Potential payoffs are
also limited as there is no provision for punitive damages in tort
law, and judges, rather than juries, determine awards.
Political leaders saw American legal style, and American lawyers, as an explicit threat to the Japanese approach to regulation.
Japanese industry feared the emergence of American style litigation, legal expenses and damage awards. Japanese lawyers, often
acting under the aegis of the Japanese Federation of Bar Associations (Nichibenren), wished to restrict competition by limiting the
number of lawyers party to their domestic monopoly and keeping
foreign lawyers out of their captive market. Except during the Oc65 This number includes five foreign lawyers (unkai-in) who were deemed by
the Supreme Court of Japan to possess sufficient knowledge of Japanese before
the 1955 amendment of the Lawyers Law and sixteen Okinawa lawyers granted
lawyers status at the time the United States returned Okinawa to Japan. Japan
Federation of Bar Associations, Outline of the Federation, at http://www.
nichibenren.or.jp/english/outline.htm (last updated Dec. 2001).
66 Mike Jacobs, Squeezed: Missing Skills Stifle Economic Vitality, THE JOURNAL
(American Chamber of Commerce in Japan), Sept. 12, 2000 (citing data from the
Japanese Ministry of Justice). See also Kathryn Tolbert, Japan Altering Legal System
to Produce More Lawyers; Tradition of Consensus Inadequatefor Business Needs, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 3, 2000, at A26 (citing a figure of one lawyer for every 400 residents in

the United States).
67 Dan Fenno Henderson, The Role of Lawyers in Japan, in JAPAN: ECONOMIC
SuccEss & LEGAL SYSTEM 27, 30-40 (Harald Baum ed., 1996). There were 35,381
gy6sei shoshi as of February 28, 2001. Telephone interview with Japan Federation
of Gyoseishoshi Lawyers Associations (Mar. 27, 2002). There were 65,782 zeiri-shi
as of February 15, 2001. See Japan Federation of Certified Public Tax Accountant's
Associations Website, at http://www.nichizeiren.or.jp/03map/map.asp. As of
April 1, 2001, there were 17,075 shiho shoshi. See Japan Federation of Shihoshoshi
Lawyer's Associations Website at http://www.shiho-shoshi.or.jp/data/zen
koku.htm. As of November 30, 2001, there were 4819 benri-shi. See Japan Patent
Attorneys Association Website at http://www.jpaa.or.jp/list/memlisthtml.
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cupation, and with the minor exception of a tiny class of foreign
lawyers grandfathered at that time, foreign lawyers were entirely
excluded from the Japanese legal services market until 1986.68
4.2. Americanization in Japan
In the 1990s, Japanese legal style has been Americanized in a
number of significant respects and across a number of policy areas.
The two factors we identify above in Section 2, economic liberalization, including the entry of American law firms, and the fragmentation of public authority, have played central roles in encouraging the Americanization of Japanese law. As a result, Japanese
legal style across a wide range of policy areas has started to involve
more transparency, disclosure, codification of administrative procedures, adversarial legal contestation, and reliance on the services
of larger law firms. We will explore the causal mechanisms behind
these shifts in detail in the case studies that follow, but we begin
with an overview of more general trends.
4.2.1.

Political Fragmentation

The watershed in terms of political fragmentation came in June
1993 with the election of the first non-Liberal Democratic Party
government of the post-war era and the subsequent reform of the
electoral system in 1994, brought on by the collapse of stock and
land-price bubbles, the ensuing prolonged recession, repeated corruption scandals, and a split in the LDP. In the 1993 election, the
LDP was ousted from government after nearly forty years of uninterrupted dominance and was replaced by a coalition government headed by Prime Minister Hosokawa. The new coalition
government took power having made a commitment to reforming
Japan's electoral system within one year. They made good on that
promise and introduced a new electoral system based on a combination of single member districts and proportional representation
to replace the existing single non-transferable vote, multi-member
district system. 69

Hall, supra note 64, at 24.
See GERALD L. CURTIS, THE LOGIC OF JAPANESE POLITICS 137-70 (1999) (describing Japan's electoral reform); TAKAYUKI SAKAMOTO, BUILDING POLICY
LEGITIMACY IN JAPAN 99-133 (1999) (discussing the change in the Japanese election
system from a multi-member district system to one that combines single-member
districts and proportional representation).
68

69
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The LDP's 1993 loss and the subsequent electoral reform encouraged a shift in Japanese legal style in two ways. First, the end
of LDP dominance increased the degree of political uncertainty in
Japanese politics. Before 1993, LDP leaders, who could reasonably
expect their party to maintain control indefinitely, controlled the
bureaucracy through a variety of informal incentive structures
backed by ongoing monitoring.70 LDP leaders had no incentive to
establish formal, codified administrative procedures and to invite
judicial review. After the LDP's 1993 defeat and the 1994 electoral
reform, however, leaders of the LDP and those of other parties
were faced with great uncertainty regarding future electoral outcomes. The opposition parties who suddenly found themselves in
a position of power had a great incentive to codify administrative
procedures and invite judicial review in order to increase the accountability and transparency of the bureaucracy that had for so
long been tightly linked to the LDP. Even LDP leaders had an incentive to formalize and judicialize mechanisms of bureaucratic
control, as its existing informal mechanisms were no longer viable
in light of the new electoral uncertainty. The electoral reform had
a second effect on the incentives of politicians that encouraged a
While Japan's traditional single nonshift in legal style.
transferable vote ("SNTV") multi-member district system encouraged politicians to cater to narrow interest groups such as business
constituencies, the new electoral system gives politicians greater
incentives to appeal to large portions of the electorate with policies
favoring diffuse public interests."' As a result, political leaders
have an incentive to open up the regulatory process to previously
largely excluded diffuse public interest groups such as consumers
and environmentalists.
The coalition seized on its newfound power immediately to
push for a reform of the administrative procedures that would increase the accountability and transparency of the bureaucracy that
for so long had been controlled by the LDP. The Administrative
Procedures Law ("APL"), enacted in November of 1993, contained
a host of measures aimed at codifying existing administrative pro-

& ROSENBLUTH, supra note 24, at 142-60.
Frances Rosenbluth & Michael Thies, The Electoral Foundations of Japan's
Financial Politics: The Case of the Jusen 22-23 (unpublished manuscript), (on file
with author), available at http://www.yale.edu/leitner/pdf/1999-02.pdf (last visited Nov. 26,2001).
70 RAMSEYER
71
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cedures and increasing transparency. 72 The APL established formal procedures governing the use of administrative guidance and
codified the procedures for licensing and permitting activities. The
APL also included procedures for hearings and requires that bureaucrats "give reasons" for their decisions. These and other aspects of the law follow the approach taken by the U.S. Administrative Procedures Act. In response to the APL, individual ministries
have established their own formalized administrative procedures,
in line with APL requirements. Firms have also shown more willingness to challenge administrative guidance. 73
The wave of reform did not end with the fall of Hosokawa, but
persisted through the shifting coalition governments of the mid1990s and through the LDP's return to power as the overwhelmingly largest partner in a coalition government following the 1996
election. The enactment of the Disclosure of Information Act (or
Law Concerning Access to Information Held by Administrative
Organs) in 1999 was an example of this continuing trend. Proponents of government accountability had pushed for a freedom of
information law modeled on the U.S. Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA") for over twenty years, but the LDP had consistently
blocked such proposals at the national level.74 In 1998, the Hashimoto government presented an information disclosure bill to the
Diet as part of a series of reforms intended to increase the transparency and accountability of the bureaucracy. 75 Finally, the Disclosure of Information Act was adopted in May 1999 and took effect in 2001. The law allows individuals to request government
information and establishes institutions and administrative and judicial procedures to hear appeals in cases where the government
denies information requests. The promulgation of the law marked
a major change in regulatory philosophy toward transparency and
accountability in government. 76
72 Duck, supra note 57, at 1729-40.
73 Id. at 1745.
74 See Sonni Efron, Right-to-Know Law Changing Shape of Japan,

L.A. TIMES,
May 11, 1999, at Al (describing the passing of the new law); Measures needed to
make information disclosure work, ASAHI NEWS SERVICE, May 10, 1999, available at
Lexis Academic Universe, World News Library.
75 Lawrence Repeta & Jody Chafee, Japanese Government Information: New
Rules for Access, JAPAN INFORMATION ACCESS PROJECT, SPECIAL REPORT (June 1998),
availableat http://www.jiaponfine.org/specialreports/joho.html (last visited Mar.
18, 2002).
76

Id.
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The passage of the Nonprofit Organization ("NPO") Law of
1998 further oriented Japan toward a more transparent regulatory
environment and facilitated the emergence of a larger number of
NGOs capable of influencing public policy~z Traditionally, nonprofit organizations in Japan could acquire and maintain legal
status through the explicit permission of the competent bureaucratic authority. Without legal status, groups could not enter contracts (i.e., for renting facilities) and generally had difficulty gaining recognition and legitimacy. Bureaucrats were given almost
unlimited discretion in making decisions over the authorization of
nonprofit organizations. Many groups were denied legal standing,
while those that won it were subject to ongoing supervision and
the threat that their status might be revoked if they strayed from
the preferences of the bureaucracy. The tight restrictions on nonprofit organizations were part of the LDP's effort to keep outsiders
from interfering with the closed, informal decision making processes that went on within the Iron Triangle.
Pressured by its coalition partners, the SDP and Sakigake, the
LDP agreed to a law that decreases bureaucratic control over
NPOs. The new NPO Law permits groups to gain legal status
without bureaucratic screening and to maintain status without
administrative guidance, enhancing the status, independence and
potential influence of NPOs pursuing diverse political agencies.
The new NPO Law has already significantly increased the number
of NPOs.
4.2.2.

Economic Liberalization and the Grow7ing Presence of U.S.
Law Finns.

Japan underwent a massive liberalization of its economy from
the early 1980s through the 1990s. Between 1980 and 1996, the
government of Japan entered into forty-five major trade agreements with the United States alone.78 As discussed in the case
studies in the following sections, economic liberalization led to the
introduction of new entrants into a previously sheltered economy
and the need for re-regulation in a liberalized environment.
Among the many areas of economic activity liberalized from
the mid 1980s onward, perhaps the most significant for the Ameri77 See Robert Pekkanen, Japan's New Politics: The Case of the NPO Law, 26 J.
JAPANESE STUD. 111 (2000).
78 AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE IN JAPAN, MAKING TRADE TALKS WORK 12

(1997).
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canizing of the practice of law has been the liberalization of the legal system itself. The partial opening of the Japanese legal market
to foreign lawyers in 1986, periodic reduction of restrictions on
practice by foreign legal professionals through the rest of the 1990s,
and the growing presence of law firms in Japan have encouraged a
further Americanization of legal practice. In the early 1980s, as Tokyo emerged as a world business and financial center, American
law firms sought to enter the Japanese market. After several years
of active negotiations on access to the Japanese legal market between 1982 and 1986, the Japanese government relented, in part to
pressures from the U.S. government to open its legal services industry to American law firms, with the Foreign Lawyers Special
Act of 1986. 79 While the Foreign Lawyers Special Act constituted a
watershed, it severely restricted the activities of foreign lawyers in
a number of ways. Foreign lawyers operating in Japan could advise only on issues of their home country's law; they were prohibited from advising clients on Japanese law or on matters of third
country law. More significantly, foreign law firms could not employ Japanese lawyers, could not form partnerships with Japanese
lawyers, and were restricted in the ability to use their firm name in
the Japanese market. Consistent with their design, these restrictions stunted the growth of foreign firms in Japan and limited their
ability to serve both foreign and Japanese clients.80
American law firms in Japan and the U.S. government continued to lobby heavily for loosening restrictions on foreign law firms
in Japan with further liberalizing reforms of the law being undertaken in 1994, 1996, and 1998.81 Today, foreign lawyers are allowed
to advise clients on matters of third country law, but are still restricted from advising on Japanese law. Foreign law firms are still
prohibited from hiring Japanese lawyers in Japan, but foreign law
firms can form "specified joint enterprises" (tokutei kyodo jigyo)
with Japanese firms through which Japanese lawyers of the venture may advise on Japanese law. Though the restrictions are bur79 Gaikoku bengoshi ni yoru h6ristsu jimu no toriatsukai ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi-h6 [Special Measures Law Concerning the Handling of Legal Business
by Foreign Lawyers], Law No. 66 of 1986, available at http://www.jcaa.or.jp/e/
arbitration-e/kaiketu-e/special.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2002).
80 See Todd M. McHenry, When is a Reform not a Reform? The Ongoing Effort to
Provide International Legal Services in Japan, THE JOURNAL (American Chamber of
Commerce in Japan), May 1998. The restrictions also stunted the internationalization of Japanese firms.
81 See Hall, supra note 64, at 25-29; Henderson, supranote 67, at 66-67.
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densome, the success of several of these arrangements and the extremely high demand for legal services in recent years in Japan has
led to the adoption of this structure by a number of U.S. and U.K.
firms with practices in Japan.
Though the prohibitions on foreign firms directly hiring Japanese lawyers and on full mergers with Japanese firms have inhibited the growth of foreign and domestic firms, the presence of U.S.
law firms in the Japanese market has begun to force restructuring
of the legal profession in Japan along American lines. The number
of American firms and lawyers working for American firms has
grown steadily since the mid-1980s. While the growth rate in U.S.
lawyers in Japan has been similar to that in Europe over this period, the number and size of American firms in Japan has remained
comparatively small in absolute terms. 82 As of May 11, 2001, there
were only 159 registered foreign lawyers (gaiben), mostly American, in the world's second largest economy, though the actual
number of foreign lawyers is several times this as most foreign
lawyers working in Japan are not formally registered as gaiben. As
recently as 1997, there were only eighty-six gaiben. However, their
influence in corporate legal matters is disproportionate to their
numbers, because, as a prominent senior partner at one U.S. firm in
Japan asserts, "The only institutions capable of handling large,
multi-jurisdictional and sophisticated transactional work are the
major international law firms." 83
Japanese corporate law firms have traditionally been tiny relative to their American counterparts, but have expanded rapidly in
recent years. The largest firm in Japan now has approximately 150
lawyers, while five years ago the largest firm was approximately
fifty lawyers. By comparison, the Tokyo branch offices of Baker &
McKenzie and White & Case, including the lawyers in their joint
venture counterparts, have approximately seventy and sixty lawyers, respectively, and provide a wide range of foreign and Japanese legal services. Japanese firms catering to multinational or
domestic clients have had to reorganize to compete. Firm sizes
have increased as economic liberalization and domestic restructuring have required large teams of lawyers to perform work such
Based on data compiled from "The NLJ 250" published annually in the
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL and from "The AmLaw 100" published annually in THE
82

AMERICAN LAWYER.
83 Mike Jacobs, Squeezed: Missing Skills Stifle Economic Vitality, THE JOURNAL,
Sept. 2000, at 12.
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as due diligence for mergers and acquisitions and asset securitization. Legal practice in Japan has also become increasingly specialized. Although small when measured against the absolute scale of
recent European mergers, recent mergers among major Japanese
firms and the formation of a number of "specified joint venture arrangements" with foreign firms have sent shockwaves through the
tiny and insular corporate legal community in Tokyo. 4 Between
1985 and 1998, there was a doubling of the number of firms employing more than ten lawyers in Tokyo and a quadrupling of the
same in Osaka.8 5 Geographic expansion within Japan remains
prohibited by bar association rules restricting a firm to one office in
Japan.
As various reforms aimed at increasing transparency and bureaucratic accountability have increased the need for lawyers in Japan, the government has been undertaking reforms to increase the
number of legal professionals. The Supreme Court Legal Research
Institute has already begun offering two intakes a year, shortened
the training period from two years to a year and a half, and increased the number of would-be lawyers that complete its training
course annually from 500 to 600 in 1991 to 1000 in 2000. The final
report of the government-sponsored Judicial Reform Council, issued in June 2001, calls for the establishment of American style
post-graduate law schools by 2004 and for tripling the number of
students who qualify for the bar annually. Moreover, the report
calls for measures to facilitate pre-trial discovery and to facilitate
citizen access to legal services by shortening trials and lowering the

84 Nagashima & Ohno, Japan's largest firm, and Tsunematsu, Yanase & Sekine, an old and prominent Japanese firm, merged in January 2001 to become the
country's largest law firm with approximately 150 lawyers. The venerable Aoki
firm merged with the Tokyo operations of Baker & McKenzie, which operates as a
Japanese firm in Japan, in April 2001. Recently, Mori Sogo, one of Japan's largest
firms, and Hamada & Matsumoto, perhaps the most respected specialized capital
markets firm, agreed to merge their current total of 134 lawyers by 2003. A number of prominent and less prominent lawyers have also left their domestic firms to
pursue opportunities at the major U.S. and U.K. firms. For example, Simmons &
Simmons announced in 2001 the formation of a specified joint-enterprise with
TMI Associates, a forty-four lawyer M&A and intellectual property practice. Allen & Overy and Freshfields Brukhaus Deringer have also set up joint ventures.

See, e.g., Simmons & Simmons Tokyo JV May Spark Fusionsfieber,Japanese Style, INT'L

FIN. L. REv., Nov. 2001 at 6.
85 ASIAPAC. LEGAL500 (2000).
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cost of litigation.8 6 The Koizumi government has endorsed the
plan and pledged to follow its recommendations.
4.2.3.

SecuritiesRegulation in Japan

Changes in the way securities markets are regulated, once perhaps the most salient example of administrative guidance and iron
triangle politics, reveal further Americanization. Although operating under a similar basic statutory framework, traditionally, securities regulation in Japan has differed markedly from that in the
United States. First, the regulatory regime has focused on attempting to reduce risk through the careful licensing of new entrants and restricting the range of permissible investment products. 8 7 This focus has resulted in public disclosure of information
useful to investors that is more limited in scope and is less timely
than in the United States. Second, securities regulation by the
Ministry of Finance ("MOF"') has been marked by notorious opacity rather than transparency in practice, little resort to formal rules
and procedures, and a reliance on the use of "administrative guidance" to achieve regulatory objectives. Finally, privatization of incentives for enforcement has been, on the whole, less comprehensive than in the United States. While much of this traditional
approach persists, political fragmentation and economic liberalization have pushed Japan away from this traditional framework toward one more similar in philosophy to U.S. practice.
4.2.3.1.

Favoring "Merit"Regulation over Disclosure

Japan emerged from the Allied Occupation of Japan with a
statutory infrastructure for the regulation of securities similar to
the United States. The Securities and Exchange Law of 1948
("SEL") foisted on Japan by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers ("SCAP"), was patterned after the 33 Act and the 34
Act of the United States and became the statutory cornerstone of
the Japanese securities regulatory regime. An independent Japanese SEC was created with investigative regulatory powers, and
civil liability was instituted for including misleading and false
See Judicial Reform Panel Calls for More Lawyers, Jury System, Faster Trials,
TIMES, May 22, 2001, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/getarticle.pl5?nn20010522a5.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2001); Reforms Sought to
Increase Number ofAttorneys, NIKKIoWKLY, Oct 30, 2000, at 6.
87 See, e.g., Yukihiko Endo, HistoricalDevelopment of the Japanese FinancialSystem, in JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKETs 3,4-13 (1996).
86

JAPAN
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statements in the registration statement. Unlike the U.S. SEC, the
independent Japanese SEC did not initially emerge as a watchdog
of disclosure. In fact, it disbanded as soon as the Peace Treaty was
signed in 1951, and its powers transferred to the Finance Management Bureau of MOF. In an economy where bank-led financing
would dominate for decades, securities regulation was not deemed
important enough to even merit Bureau level status within the
MOF until 1965 when the Securities Bureau was created. Enforcing
quality public disclosure did not become a regulatory priority
within the MOF.88 Given the narrow definition of "security" in Japan, regulators focused more attention on which industry, banking
or securities, would be permitted to handle new financial products
than on investor protection. 89
The inattention to promoting quality disclosure by Japanese
regulators led to markets plagued by lax and fraudulent disclosure
and numerous scandals. For example, following a famous securities fraud involving Sanyo Specialty Steel Co. Ltd., the MOF investigated reports of over 1000 companies, and revealed that approximately ten percent of these companies had made false or
misleading statements and that 210 certified public accountants
had submitted false audit reports. 90
Instead of adopting the U.S. approach of forcing disclosure, the
MOF amended the SEL and regulated securities in order to restrict
the number of market participants and control the types of investments investors could make. In 1965, for example, the U.S.-style
broker dealer registration system (in which a securities firm meeting the minimum formal requirements simply announces its commencement of business) was thrown out and replaced with a licensing system that gave MOF licensing power over securities
firms, helping give rise to the so-called "convoy system" (gos6 sendan h6shiki) that virtually precluded the entry of new participants
It is perhaps no accident that, to this day, Japanized versions of English
words for concepts such as "disclosure," "transparency," "accountability," and
"insider trading" are used in lieu of original Japanese words, possibly suggesting
the "foreignness" of these concepts.
89 See Hideki Kanda, Developments in Japanese Securities Regulations: An Overview, 29 INT'L LAW. 599 (1995). For an excellent overview of the role of MOF in
"managing" the securities markets, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, Managing the Market:
the Ministry of Finance and Securities Regulation in Japan, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 423
(1994).
88

90 JONATHAN ISAACS & TAKASHI

EJIRI, JAPANESE SECURITIES MARKETS 156 (1990).

See also I. Kawamoto & Y. Ohtake, Securities and Exchange Law -Market, System and
Enterprisesin the Transmitting Era, NIHON KEIZAI J., 1987, at 24.
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(and guaranteed the continuing survival of existing ones) into the
broker-dealer business and other financial markets for decades.9 '
Organizations such as the Tokyo Stock Exchange ("TSE") and
the Japan Association of Securities Dealers ("JASD") that engage in
self-regulation (Uishukisei) subject to MOF guidance have also traditionally emphasized merit regulation rather than disclosure. 92 In
order to list on an exchange in Japan, an issuer must furnish the
exchange officials with an extremely detailed application comprised of two parts. Part I (commonly referred to as ichi no bu), the
much smaller of the two, essentially forms the registration statement (yuka shoken todokesho) which is publicly filed with the MOF
and, with some modification, becomes the statutory prospectus
(mokuromisho) distributed to investors. The generally more voluminous Part II (commonly referred to as ni no bu) is available only
to the relevant exchange. The exchange actively reviews both Part
I and Part II, and conducts an extensive investigation of the company over a long period of time, including interviews with employees. The exchanges do not generally force additional disclosure, but instead focus on judging whether the issuer is "qualified"
to list on the exchange. Stock exchanges can order listed companies to provide immediate disclosure of information to investors,
but in the past this was a rare event.93 In addition, unlike the more
proactive role of the SEC in forcing substantive improvements in
disclosure practices, the MOF's role in reviewing the registration
statement is typically limited to ensuring formalistic compliance
with form requirements.
4.2.3.2.

BureaucraticInformalism- Regulation in the Shadow
of the Law

Just as the MOF traditionally has not been demanding of the
disclosures it requires of issuers, it has not been demanding of
transparency in its own activities. While the MOF has long issued
ordinances and drafted Cabinet Orders for approval by the Cabi91 For a description of the convoy system and compartmentalization of financial markets, see Eric C. Sibbitt, A Brave New World for M&A ofFinancialInstitutions
in Japan,19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 965 (1998).
92 For a comparison of the New York Stock Exchange and Tokyo Stock Exchange and the comparative environments in which they operated as of 1990, see
Jonathan Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchanges As a Firm; The Emergence of
Close Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REv.

1007 (1990).

93 ISAACS & TAKAHASH,

supra note 90, at 146.
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net, the crucial issue of interpretation has been largely oral and informal. These actions often took the form of a personal visit to the
MOF or a telephone call, to which nothing was public and everything was generally unwritten. Even where written guidance of
some kind was provided, this guidance mainly took the form of
administrative directives known as tsutatsu or administrative instructions known as jimu-renraku rather than formal ordinances.
Formal legal procedures have almost never been invoked by the
MOF, its injunctive power has seldom been used, and there are few
claims raised by private litigants against MOF actions. Most enforcement actions and policy initiatives have been performed informally often in consultation with what were the "Big Four" securities firms (Nomura, Daiwa, Nikko and Yamaichi) through the use
of administrative guidance. 94 Almost no cases challenging any
MOF interpretation of, or regulatory action under, the SEL exist.95
4.2.3.3.

Limited Privatizationof Enforcement

In stark contrast to the United States, private incentives for
compliance with the securities laws have been limited. The threat
of private litigation has played virtually no role in encouraging
compliance with securities regulatory principles or enforcing disclosure in Japan. 96 Claims by aggrieved investors under the SEL
are virtually unheard of. Even under a broader corporate law
claim, between 1950 and 1990, shareholders filed fewer than
twenty derivative suits in Japan. 97 In fact, the threat was so minimal that directors and officers insurance, a standard insurance
product in the United States, was not introduced into Japan until
94 The "Big Four" is now more like the "Big Two-and-a-Half" with the bankruptcy of Yamaichi and integrated activities of Nikko Securities and Salomon
Smith Barney.

95 See Christopher P. Wells & Haruko Yamamori, Securities & Banking Law, in
JAPAN BUSINEss LAW GUIDE 65-160 (CCH International). This may in part be be-

cause the major securities firms have had an ex ante informal role in shaping the
rules.
96 However, public exposure of something scandalous in the mass media
subjects executives to the disciplining force of public shame, sometimes forcing
them to make public apologies, resign or reduce their salaries.
97

Mark D. West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the

United States, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1436, 1438 (1994). Moreover, traditionally these
suits were limited to disputes for private companies, not relating to publicly listed
ones. See also Kenji Utsumi, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative
Suits in Japan:A Comparison with Those in the United States, 14 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 129

(2001).
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1990, and even then only for risks of exposure to lawsuits overseas.
Director's and officer's insurance for threats arising in Japan was
not sold until 1994. Although commentators have expressed numerous views on the reasons behind the lack of litigation in Japan
generally, including a cultural aversion to overt and formal conflict, the fact is that such litigation was all but impossible because
of (i) limited statutory causes of action and (ii) a general legal infrastructure that made it time-consuming, expensive, and difficult to
for plaintiffs prevail.98
In fact, prior to 1989, there was little incentive for "insiders" to
refrain from using non-public information to their advantage, as
Japan effectively lacked an insider trading regime. 99 Not unlike the
United States and United Kingdom in earlier times, trading, particularly by corporations, based on inside information was a common practice.
The extreme shortage of lawyers forms an institutional barrier
to privatizing enforcement in Japan. Although there are no available statistics, there are probably only a few hundred lawyers
dealing primarily with securities law matters in all of Japan.
Moreover, the activities of foreign legal professionals have also
been tightly restricted. The limitation on the number of lawyers
has profound implications for securities regulation in Japan. First,
there are smaller potential classes of public prosecutors and feeseeking private plaintiffs lawyers to seek out securities disclosurerelated problems, and a smaller class of judges to handle cases. As
a result, the threat felt by companies is limited. Second, in part because of the difficulty and cost of securing a lawyer as well as the
reduced threat of litigation, lawyers are less involved in the securities registration process. For example, companies and underwriters rather than lawyers usually draft the prime disclosure docu93 The lack of juries in Japan may also contribute to the difficulty of prevailing in Japan as "the deference... [United States] courts show their juries increases
their willingness to let implausible claims go to trial. Freed from that concern,
Japanese judges apparently dismiss nuisance suits far earlier and more frequently." J. MARK RAMSEYER, VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN JAPAN: SPECULATIONS FROM
TAx LAW AND CIVIL PROCEDURE 3.2 (Inst for Monetary and Econ. Studies, Bank of
Japan, Discussion Paper No. 97-E-6,1997).
99 Although the SEL had a general fraud provision in Article 58 of the law, it
was never applied to insider trading. See OKAMURA & TAKESHMTA, LAWS &
REGULATIONS RELATING TO INSIDER TRADING IN JAPAN (1989). Only employees of
securities firms were banned from trading on inside information, pursuant to a
1965 ministerial ordinance issued pursuant to the MOF's licensing power under
the SEL, though the level of enforcement is certainly questionable.
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ments for domestic offerings by Japanese companies and underwriters in domestic offerings conduct much of their due diligence
investigations using in-house staff. With fewer securities professionals, the ability of the Bar to contribute to the robustness of the
legal reform process is also limited.
4.2.3.4.

Americanization of Securities Regulation

Political fragmentation and economic liberalization have
pushed Japan away from its traditional framework toward one
more similar in philosophy to U.S. practice. The forces of economic
liberalization helped fragment the regulation of the securities sector in a number of ways. First, U.S. government demands that Japan open up its financial sector introduced an outside force to the
"financial iron triangle" comprised of the MOF, the LDP, and the
finance industry that could not be easily ignored. Continued U.S.
gaiatsu ("foreign pressure") led to the February 13, 1995 Measures
by the Government of Japan and the Government of the United
States Regarding Financial Services. Included among the basic objectives of the agreement were removal of barriers to market access, both formal and informal, for competitive foreign financial
firms, broadening the range of permitted instruments in the domestic securities and simplifying and increasing the transparency
of regulations governing cross-border capital transactions. Japan
also committed itself to making financial regulation fully transparent, providing for foreign participation in financial advisory
groups, assuring that administrative guidance is voluntary and
given in writing if requested, and that licensing and approval of financial activities is in accordance with published standards.
Second, the gradual success of U.S. firms in the Japanese securities markets turned them into a major domestic forces that demanded regulatory attention. Following the first steps toward internationalization of Japan's securities markets and the
liberalization of restrictions on foreign market entrants in the
1970s, 100 foreign financial institutions steadily increased their pres100 In 1971, the enactment of the Law on Foreign Securities Firms enabled foreign securities firms to legally operate in Japan, while the removal of the ban on
investments in foreign securities by the investing public opened the public securities market to them. Foreign issuers started to participate in the Japanese financial
markets with the first samurai bond issuance (a yen-denominated bond by a foreign issuer) in 1971, and the opening of a Foreign Section of the TSE followed by a
few listings by foreign firms in 1973.
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ence in the Japanese market as restrictions on their activities were
reduced. 101 Whereas securities regulation often took the form of
informal consultation between the MOF and the Big Four, half of
the Big Four became tightly integrated with foreign financial firms.
Merrill Lynch picked up the retail brokerage assets of the bankrupt
Yamaichi Securities, while Salomon Smith Barney entered into a
strategic joint venture with Nikko Securities, then rumoured to be
in less than sound condition. As foreign investment banks grew in
power and domestic ones waned or collapsed, it became inevitable
that U.S. firms would have a greater impact on financial service
practices. These firms wielded clout not only through the American government (it is noteworthy that Robert Rubin, former Secretary of the Treasury and a former chairman of Goldman Sachs,
signed the 1995 Financial Services Agreement with Japan on behalf
of the United States government), but also as powers with domestic political influence-foreign investment banks now employ
thousands in their Japanese branches, including many from Japan's
elite, and play a critical role in access to international capital.
Third, economic liberalization helped reveal the shaky status of
many firms on the verge of collapse that had been shored up by
Japan's regulators. Failings of the regulatory system began to
manifest themselves with the collapse of the Bubble Economy in
1989, and the emergence of scandals implicating bureaucrats, politicians and the securities industry. The collapse of the Bubble
Economy weakened the unshakable faith in the Japanese bureaucracy as the enlightened stewards of the Japanese economic "miracle," while the economic fallout from the collapse gave rise to
popular dissenting voices from businesses and individuals alike.
Businesses complained about the inferior level of know-how at
Japanese financial institutions and the poor quality of the services
provided in relation to the costs incurred. Individuals, on the other
hand, saw the rapid appreciation in personal assets, particularly
land, halt and became increasingly fearful of the status of their
pension funds. Almost all taxpayers, both corporate and individual, opposed taxpayer-funded bailouts of the country's heavily indebted home-mortgage lenders (jusen).102
101 For example, foreign firms were allowed to become members of the TSE,
and the Foreign Exchange Control and Foreign Trade Law was amended to make
foreign securities transactions "free in principle" rather than "prohibited in principle," though a prior notification requirement persisted until further amendment

in 1991.

102 Polls indicated that over ninety percent of the public opposed such use.
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The revelation of massive amounts of non-performing loans on
the books of financial institutions only discredited the bureaucracy
further. Numerous scandals have discredited the MOF further
with public anger often tipping the balance in the passage of reforms oriented at curtailing the power of the bureaucracy and reorient the regulatory style. A number of securities-related reforms
were undertaken from the late 1980s onward, with the most ambitious plan being the Big Bang, modeled after the Big Bang in the
United Kingdom and announced by Hashimoto, in 1996, as aimed
at making Japan's markets free, fair, and global. 103
4.2.3.5.

PromotingDisclosure

With financial regulators evidently no longer capable of making most of the decisions themselves, particularly with the increasing internationalization, complexity, and diversification of investors in the Japanese financial markets, it became essential to
empower a broader range of market participants with the information necessary to make their own decisions. In response, Japan
has adopted an approach that increasingly emphasizes the quality
and scope of disclosure in order to meet the needs of a more liberal
economic environment. In 1988, reporting of transactions by officers and ten percent shareholders became mandatory, and in 1989,
trading on non-public information (and hence encouraging the
timely disclosure of that information) was made clearly a criminal
offense. 04 In 1990, disclosure of shareholdings by five percent
shareholders was required. In 1992, the SEL was amended to provide disclosure and antifraud rules in connection with repurchase
by a company of its own shares. The Japanese Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ("GAAP"), known for their "flexibility,"
continued to grow closer to U.S. GAAP with recent changes including consolidated reporting, mark-to-market accounting and
changes in valuation of pensions.
Exchanges such as the TSE have also become more active in
forcing issuers, through informal discussion, to make timely dis103 The reforms included deregulation of brokerage commissions, an end to
foreign exchange controls, enhanced competition among banks, insurers and securities firms, freedom to offer new financial products, and increased transparency in accounting and reporting standards.
104 Criminal sanctions were effectively introduced for the first time, with up
to six months imprisonment and fines of up to Y500,000. Law No. 75 of 1988,
amending the SEL.
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closure to investors. In 1999, the TSE undertook a number of initiatives to lower restrictions on listing criteria and rules for both its
First and Second Sections, and introduced stricter requirements for
timely disclosure, in addition to establishing the Mothers market to
attract and fund U.S. style high-growth venture businesses. The
Mothers market adopted a more U.S. approach, lowering listing
standards (in fact lower than Nasdaq Japan or Nasdaq in the
United States), promised a faster approval process, and required
greater disclosure than is required on other sections of the Tokyo
Stock Exchange. Quarterly reporting was required (as in the
United States) rather than the typical semi-annual financial reporting of Japanese companies. The TSE even became more aggressive than the SEC in encouraging issuers to make earnings
projections. The Japanese market has also seen similar U.S. style
regulations being promulgated by the Jasdaq OTC market, as well
as by Nasdaq Japan, a joint venture between Nasdaq and the
Osaka Securities Exchange.
4.2.3.6.

IncreasingTransparencyin Regulation

The same forces leading to the Administrative Procedures Act
and the Freedom of Information Act have been pushing MOF toward SEC-style transparency. In 1992, provisions were instituted
to replace the administrative circular notices issued by regulators
with formal orders and regulations based on specific statutory
provisions. In May 1998, MOF announced that it would end the
practice of sending individual order and injunction notices to financial institutions and switch to open publication of ordinances
clearly showing requirements for authorization. In June 1998,
MOF abolished 382 of 400 tsutatsu and 234 of 243 jimu-renraku under review, and elevated some of them to the level of formal ministerial ordinances or notices in the Official Gazette (Kanpo).10 5 The
previous practice was criticized as arbitrary and lacking transparency. In fiscal 2001, the Japanese government was to fully implement a system in which its ministries and agencies would publicize
their interpretations of the law at the request of companies and individuals. It has slowly begun to reply to such requests. The
Japanese government introduced the use of no-action letters,
103 See Marine & Fire Insurance Association of Japan, The Total Review of Administrative Directives and Instructions Related to FinancialInstitutions (Including Insurance Companies), at http://www.sonpo.or.jp/english/eng-4912 (last modified
Feb. 2,2002).
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though the thirty-day period has been criticized by many as being
too short, as well as a public comment period for new laws and
regulations. The increasing use of formal enforcement powers, as
discussed above, also reflects a more formal approach.
This increased openness is backed by a willingness to prosecute
those that continue to operate under the principles of old. In January 1998, public prosecutors, for the first time in fifty years, entered
the MOF to arrest a MOF official. The official was charged with
leaking the dates, times and locations of MOF bank inspections, in
what became notorious in Japan for the "no pan shabu shabu" scandal which became notorious in virtually every household in Japan.106 In a symbolic move, prime minister Hashimoto appointed
the new vice-minister himself without consulting the bureaucracy,
ignoring the long-standing practice of consulting MOF bureaucrats. Ironically, the evidence eventually implicating two ministry
officials came about as the result of greater powers allocated to
prosecutors to go after financial racketeers known as sokaiya (literally "shareholder meetings specialists") as a result of a reform of
the commercial code aimed at improving corporate governance.
The financial scandals involving major securities houses that
came to light in 1991 (primarily involving loss compensation) led
to 1992 amendments establishing the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission ("SESC") to serve as a watchdog of the securities industry. Though the SESC was designed to be more independent than other bureaus of the MOF, it initially remained under
MOF control. However, in 1998, after further scandals and
mounting pressure from opposition parties, the Hashimoto government dealt the MOF a major blow by transferring control of the
SESC to a new independent regulatory body, the Financial Supervisory Agency ("FSA"). The SESC is an independent watchdog for
the securities market, akin to an SEC but with fewer powers and
less than ten percent of the staff.107 In addition to monitoring the
day-to-day trading activities of the securities companies, the SESC
investigates illegal securities trading, brings charges against viola106 "No pan shabu shabu" is a Chinese-style hot-pot restaurant where the
women remove their panties for a tip, adding additional color to the corruption
scandal. The fallout would result in three suicides, the resignation of the finance
minister, and the firing of two of his civil vice-ministers. See, e.g., Andrew Horvat,
MOF Fried in '"o Pan Shabu Shabu," EUROMONEY, Mar. 1998 (commenting on the
impact the "shabu shabu" scandal had on Japan's Ministry of Finance).
107 See Ryu Osumi & Takeshi Ando, Securities Agencies Vow to Cooperate,
NiKKEi WKLY., Dec. 18, 2000.
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tors of the SEL to the attention of public prosecutors and recommends administrative disciplinary action or policy measures to the
FSA. Furthermore, the revamped SESC is more active than its
MOF predecessor in the use of its formal enforcement powers. In
1999, it lodged seven accusations with the public prosecutors office
(including three cases of submitting securities reports with false information, two cases of employing deceptive devices in the sale of
securities, one case of insider trading and one case or market manipulation) as well as thirty-seven recommendations to the Financial Recovery Commission and the Financial Reconstruction Commission (which were merged in January 2001) for disciplinary
administrative actions against securities companies and directors
or employees of securities companies for breaches of the SEL.
4.2.3.7.

Privatizationof Enforcement

Reforms have also been undertaken to improve the ability of
individuals to take matters into their own hands, rather than relying solely on the bureaucracy to protect their interests. When
criminal sanctions were introduced for insider trading in 1989, in
part a response to four widely publicized cases of insider trading
in 1987,108 companies and shareholders were given the power to
sue for profits when an officer or ten percent shareholder of the
company profits from the sale and purchase within a six month period of the company's securities. 10 9 Officers and ten percent shareholders were also required to file reports with MOF when trading
in a company's shares, helping to make the public aware of
changes in control. In May 1992, the insider trading regulations,
which had previously been limited to securities traded on an exchange, were extended to cover insiders of OTC companies. As of
1996, there had been four convictions and by the end of 2000, a total of thirteen recommendations for prosecution by the SESC.
The commercial code was also revised in 1993 to make derivative suits (kabunushi daihyo sosho) easier and less costly and to increase damage amounts to include reasonable costs beyond litiga-

108 The most important of these was the Tateho Chemical Case in which insiders at Tateho and Tateho's bankers dumped large amounts of Tateho stock on
the market in advance of the announcement of Tateho's bankruptcy. On the Recruit affair, see Tomoko Akashi, Note, Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1296 (1989).
109 Art. 189 of Sh6kentorihiki H [Securities and Exchange Law], Law No. 25
of 1948. If the company does not sue within sixty days, then a shareholder may.
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tion and attorney costs. n 0 Strictly speaking, derivative suits are not
a securities law based claim, but are often used by shareholders to
address corporate misbehavior. Following the amendments, the
number of derivative suits has increased,"' the amount of claims
has become bigger, the number of suits against public companies
has climbed, and the purchase of directors and officers insurance
has become more popular. Reforms to the Japanese Civil Procedure code in 1996 were aimed at improving the efficient and fair
resolution of claims in the court system, though the extent of the
reforms was tempered by the fear of unleashing U.S. levels of litigation to Japan." 2 Perhaps an indication of changes to come,
though not related to the offering of securities, in September 2000,
the Osaka District Court ordered the executives of Daiwa Bank to
pay $775 million in damages for losses incurred by its New York
branch, the largest award in a shareholder compensation suit by a
factor of seventy." 3 The Osaka ruling was the first decision in a
shareholder lawsuit in Japan to hold directors responsible for failing to manage risks. More generally, the number of shareholder
lawsuits filed annually in Japan has more than tripled since 1993,
when the government lowered the filing fees for shareholder lawsuits.114

110 Prior to 1993, a claimant suing for one billion yen would owe an upfront
stamp tax of Y3,117,600, with many courts further requiring the posting of security
for expenses. After the amendment the cost was lowered to Y8,200. West, infra
note 139, at 1436-66.
111 Only thirty-one cases had been filed between 1950 and 1993. See Miyazawa, supra note 3 (citing Masaru Hayakawa, Shareholders in Japan, in JAPAN:
EcoNoMIc SuccEss & LEGAL SYSTEM 247-48) (Harold Baum ed., 1996) (discussing
the increase in derivative suits)). As of 1994, eighty-four cases were pending and
as of 2000, 206 cases were pending. Norio Henmi, K6poreto gabanansu ni kansuru

shoho-tokureih6 kaiseian no pointo [Key issues on the amendments to the commercial

code and the exemptive law relating to corporate governance],
Oct. 20, 2001, at 26.
112

JUNKAN KEIRIJOHO,

See Yasuhei Taniguchi, The 1996 Code of Civil Procedure in Japan - A Proce-

dure for the Coming Century?, 45 AM. J. CoMP. L. 767 (1997) (discussing the possibility of increased U.S. litigation in Japan).
113 See, e.g., Business execs stung by court order, NiKKEI WKLY., Sept. 25, 2000,
available at LEXIS, News Group File; Bill Spindle & Peter Landers, Japanese Court
Sets Restitution in Daiwa Suit, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Sept. 21, 2000, available at 2000
WL-WSJA 23749218 (discussing how the Osaka District Court ordered a payment
of (775 million in damages).
114

Chester Dawson, At Long Last, Law Suits, Bus. WK., Feb. 5, 2001, at 25

(noting the increase in lawsuits despite a desire by law officials to curtail lawsuits). See also George F. Parker, Note, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan:

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol23/iss2/3

2002]

AMERICANIZATION OFJAPANESE LAW

315

Securities regulation is converging on an American approach,
emphasizing transparency in regulation, democratizing information access through promoting disclosure1 5 and creating greater
opportunities for individuals to exercise legal rights independently
of the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, it is far easier and less timeconsuming to amend the substance of a statute than to increase a
country's institutional legal capacity. The practice in Japan remains distant from the United States, though it is dearly converging. It will take time for increases in the number of lawyers to begin to have a significant influence on the legal system. The dearth
of such professionals may be the largest bottleneck and put an upward limit on the pace of convergence toward a U.S. style system
of securities regulation.
4.2.4.

Products Liability Law in Japan

Prior to 1994, Japanese law placed a number of formidable
statutory barriers in the way of would be products liability plaintiffs. These barriers were so substantial that between 1945 and
116
1990 only 150 products liability cases were decided in Japan.
Most consumers brought products liability cases under negligencebased tort law, requiring consumers to prove negligence on the
part of manufacturers. 117 However, severe restrictions on pre-trial
Introducing a Private Right of Action, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1399 (1995) (discussing the
increase in lawsuits in Japan).
115 In addition to democratizing information access, recent reforms to the
commercial code facilitate the democratization of shareholding through facilitating the use of stock options and elimination of minimum par values of stock. For
example, the previous minimum par value per share of Y50,000 ($375 on March
25, 2001) discouraged the issuance of shares at per share prices more accessible to
individual investors wishing to build diversified portfolios and made holding
shares less attractive as the ability to sell in small lots was limited. Stock option
plans are now explicitly permitted, but previously the first stock option plans in
Japan required approval by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry or
evading stock option plans entirely through the issuance of bonds with detachable
warrants, where the warrants were detached from the warrants and the debt paid
back almost immediately.
116 Hiroshi Sarumida, Comparative InstitutionalAnalysis of Product Safety Systems in the United States and Japan: Alternative Approaches to Create Incentives for
Product Safety, 29 CoRNELL INT'L L.J. 79, 82 (1996) ("[O]nly 150 product liability
cases were decided between 1945 and 1990 in all of Japan.'.
117 Consumers could also bring products liability cases based on breach of
contract. However, the legal hurdles and the potential pay-offs under contract
law were so unbalanced that very few plaintiffs used that legal basis. On the traditional approach to products liability law in Japan, see Jason F. Cohen, The Japanese ProductLiability Law: Sending a Pro-ConsumerTsunami through Japan's Corporate
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discovery typically made it almost impossible for plaintiffs in
products liability cases to prove negligence on the part of manufacturers.118
In addition to these specific obstacles, the general deterrents to
litigation mentioned above also affected products liability law.
High attorney's fees, high court filing fees, the duration of trials
and the absence of punitive damage awards and contingency fee
arrangements all discouraged injured consumers from bringing
suits.119 Moreover, with the exception of a few highly publicized
mass torts, judges generally sided with manufacturers in products
liability cases.120 With high costs, a paucity of lawyers willing to
take on products liability cases, and little chance of victory in the
courtroom, it is not surprising that there was so little products liability litigation in Japan prior to 1995.
While lawyers, litigation and courts played little role in promoting product safety in Japan, the issue was not ignored. Rather,
in line with general patterns of policy making in Japan, the bureaucracy played a dominant role in the regulation of product
safety. The government promoted product safety with strict product safety standards, often in the form of precise design standards.
In addition to setting standards, the government established alternative routes for consumers to secure compensation for damages
caused by faulty products. The government established a variety
of voluntary public insurance schemes' 21 and mandatory industrywide compensation trust funds. 22 These programs sought to bring
risk sharing (between government and industry) and predictability
to the area of products liability. Consumers who bring complaints
to these funds face a lower burden of proof and enjoy a higher
probability of gaining compensation than they would in the courtand JudicialWorlds, 21 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 108, 133-37 (1997); Easton, supra note 53,
at 320, 321; Andrew Marcuse, Why Japan's New Products Liability Law Isn't, 5
PACIFIC RIM L. & POL'Y J. 365, 370-71 (1996); Phil Rothenberg, Japan's New Product
Liability Law: Achieving Modest Success, 31 LAw & PoL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 453, 455-72
(2000).
118 Marcuse, supra note 117, at 389.
119 Id. at 395.
120 Cohen, supra note 117, at 128,132.
121 For instance, the 1973 Consumer Daily Life Appliances Safety Law established a voluntary standard setting, testing and labeling scheme, coupled with a
compensation fund to cover claims made involving products which had been approved under the scheme. See Marcuse, supra note 117, at 377.
122 Manufacturers pay premiums to these funds in proportion to their market
share in the relevant industry. See Cohen, supra note 117,.at 143-44.
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room; however, the compensation amounts are determined by
fixed schedules and are lower than the awards plaintiffs might win
in court. These schemes help channel disputes away from the judicial arena and toward the arena of informal bureaucratic control. 23
4.2.5.

The New ProductLiabilitij Law

On July 1, 1994, the Japanese Diet enacted the Product Liability
Law (seizobutsu seikinin ho) (the New PL Law) that dramatically altered the products liability regime in Japan 24 The idea of adopting a products liability law based on strict liability had been debated twenty years before the Diet finally enacted the Product
Liability Act. However, Japanese government and business leaders consistently opposed the adoption of such legislation, arguing
that it would encourage frivolous litigation and maintaining that
the government's strict product standards provided consumers
with adequate protection. 125
Finally, in 1993, pressures created by economic liberalization
and political fragmentation converged to spark the passage of the
New PL Law. Economic liberalization promoted the adoption of
the New PL Law in two ways. First, the wave of deregulation that
swept over Japan decreased the ability of the bureaucracy to protect consumers through strict product regulations. This led to a
growing recognition by the government leaders that more privatized approaches to consumer protection, such as products liability
law, would be necessary to protect consumers. Second, as the liberalization of trade opened Japanese markets, foreign firms and
their governments complained that Japan's rigid product safety
standards, which substituted for products liability law, constituted
non-tariff barriers to trade. 26
123 Marcuse, supranote 117, at 378.

124 For a detailed English language review of the law, see Thomas Leo Madden, An Explanation of Japan's Product Liability Law, 5 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 299
(1996).
125 Cohen, supranote 117, at 133,144-48; Takahashi Fumitoshi, Japan's Product
Liability Law: Issues and Implications,22 J.JAPANESE STUD. 105, 105-07 (1996).
126 Cohen, supra note 117, at 148-54. The spread of American law firms as a
result of economic liberalization has had less impact in the products liability area.
Certainly, Japan's exporting manufacturers have been exposed to U.S. products
liability law and litigation as they have, of necessity, relied upon U.S. legal counsel to guide, protect, and litigate for them under the products liability regimes in
the United States. However, American law firms in Japan concentrate on securities law, mergers and acquisitions, joint venture work, intellectual property, and
other aspects of corporate law, not products liability law or litigation. Plaintiffs
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Political fragmentation, in the form of the election of the first
non-LDP government finally tipped the balance. Just as Hosokawa
and his coalition allies quickly moved to reform the Administrative
Procedures Law, they also moved quickly to reform products liability law. Consumer groups, who saw the LDP as unresponsive
to their concerns, had been important backers of the Hosokawa
coalition. Within months, the new coalition introduced a products
liability bill that was later adopted and went into force at the start
of 1994.127
The New PL Law has "Americanized" Japanese products liability law in important respects. Most importantly, Article 3 of
the New PL Law introduces the notion of strict liability into Japanese law.128 As in American products liability law, manufacturers
are liable for damages caused by their defective products, regardless of fault. Article 2(3) expands the definition of manufacturer to
include any party involved in the process of manufacturing or importing a product. 29 However, other aspects of the New PL Law
maintain the status quo of Japanese products liability law and were
disappointments for consumer activists. For instance, the definition of defect under the New PL Law in Article 2(2) will allow
courts to continue to apportion fault based on their analysis of
comparative negligence.' 30 Article 4 provides exemptions from liability under the law for component manufacturers and, more generally, for "developmental risks."' 3 ' Article 5 provides for time
limitations on claims.132 The New PL Law is silent on the issue of
the burden of proof necessary for establishing causation, and it includes no special provisions regarding pre-trial discovery for
products liability suits. Finally, Article 6 provides that where it is
silent on an issue, such as damage awards or joint-and-several li-

attorneys concentrating in products liability and personal injury have no presence
whatsoever in Japan (though they remain eager, of course, to sue these manufactures and their affiliates in the United States). While American law firms have
helped stimulate reform of the legal profession in Japan more generally and may
in the future stimulate the emergence of a U.S. style plaintiffs' bar, these reforms
have yet to give rise to a significant increase in the number of domestically trained
plaintiffs lawyers.
127 Id. at 153-54.
128 Madden, supra note 124, at 314-18.
129 Id. at 303, 312-14.
130 Id. at 308-11.
131 Id. at 319-21. See also Easton, supra note 53 (suggesting the same).
132 Madden, supra note 124, at 323-25.
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ability, existing tort and contract provisions of the Civil Code shall
apply. 33
It is still too early to assess the impact of the New PL Law;
however, we can examine some initial evidence concerning the
impact of the law on consumer and business behavior. As for consumers, while the New PL Law has not stimulated a flood of litigation, it has stimulated a dramatic increase in public interest in
products liability and has lead to an increase in the number of
products liability suits filed.34 Debates surrounding the New PL
Law attracted extensive media attention and books on products liability became the best selling law books in Japanese history.35
Among the cases brought thus far under the New PL Law are ones
involving a defective tea container, a defective condom, E. coli
bacteria in school lunches, defective boat equipment, computer error, and a defective jelly.136 Plaintiffs have made claims for medical

expenses, lost earnings, mental suffering, and wrongful death. 37
The first case decided under the New PL Law found McDonald's
guilty for selling defective orange juice to a Japanese woman. A
Nagoya court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, despite the fact that the
exact defect in the orange juice was never discovered. The court
regarded the fact that the woman had vomited blood shortly after
drinking the orange juice as sufficient evidence to conclude the
juice had been defective. 8 Another prominent, pending case involves litigation against a Japanese subsidiary of Philip Morris and
Japan Tobacco. 39
Many Japanese manufacturers have reacted to the New PL Law
by improving product safety and taking other steps to forestall
products liability suits. Manufacturers in sectors including toys,
food, electronics, alcoholic beverages, and automobiles have imId. at 325-27.
Luke Nottage, The Presentand Future of Product Liability Dispute Resolution
in Japan, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 215, 216-17 (2000); Rothenberg, supra note 117,
at 505-07.
135 Cohen, supra note 117, at 178; Rothenberg, supra note 117, at 506.
136 For a summary of cases filed under the PL law, see Luke Nottage, Reported Case Filings under the PL Law, at http://www.law.kyushu-u.ac.jp/luke/pllawcases.html (last updated May 8, 2001).
137 Id.
133 Rothenberg, supra note 117, at 489-90. The court's approach may be
analogized to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself") as applied to prove causation in negligence cases in the United States.
139 Id. at 488-89.
133
134
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proved their product instructions and safety warnings in reaction

to the enactment of the New PL Law, including employing lawyers
to review such warnings. 140 After the adoption of the New PL
Law, purchases of products liability insurance coverage by Japanese manufacturers increased dramatically.141 A number of recent
settlements indicate that manufacturers are settling products liability claims they would have previously dismissed, because of
the lowered burden of proof necessary under the New PL Law's
strict liability provisions. 142 Finally, weary of being burdened with
the liability for defective products, Japanese retailers are demanding more detailed contracts with manufacturers and consumers. 43
Where written contracts between manufacturers and retailers were
either vague or non-existent in the past, in the wake of the New PL
Law retailers are increasingly demanding that manufacturers sign
contracts assuming liability for products liability claims. 44 Simi-

larly, some retailers have begun requesting that consumers sign
waivers, protecting them against products liability claims. 45
While products liability law in Japan still differs in important
respects from American products liability law, the former has certainly converged on the latter. Provisions of the New PL Law and
the reactions of producers and consumers parallel central aspects
of American products liability law. Above all, the adoption of
strict liability brings the Japanese law closer in line with American
law. Increased concern on the part of manufacturers regarding
product labeling, liability insurance and the attention to liability
concerns in commercial contracts all reflect American practices.
Finally, increased consumer interest in products liability and increased filings of complaints certainly suggest a move toward a
more litigious approach to regulating product safety.

140 Rothenberg, supra note 117, at 496-501; Cohen, supra note 117, at 164-66. In
fact, as a summer associate at a Japanese law firm around the time of the implementation of the PL Law, one of the authors was charged with reviewing a Japanese safety warning for Japanese consumers from an "American" perspective.
141 Rothenberg, supra note 117, at 502-03. See also Jathon Sapsford, Japanese
Firms Bracefor First Laws on Consumer Rights, and Insurers Gain, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8,
1994, at A13 (explaining that prior to the passage of the law, corporate orders for
insurance coverage were rising).
142 Cohen, supranote 117, at 162-63; Rothenberg, supra note 117, at 503-05.
143 Cohen, supranote 117, at 169-72.
144 Id. at 171.
145 Id. at 172.
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CONCLUSION

Japanese legal style is becoming Americanized in important respects. Economic liberalization in the 1990s coupled with increasing political competition has led to significant changes in regulatory style. In areas ranging from administrative procedures, to the
regulation of non-profit organizations, to securities regulation, to
products liability, reforms have aimed to decrease bureaucratic
discretion, promote disclosure, increase transparency in regulation,
and arm individuals with a greater ability to exercise legal rights.
Economic liberalization has opened the Japanese economy to
new entrants, both foreign and domestic, and reduced bureaucratic
involvement in the economy. As the economy liberalized, it became clear that the traditional approach to regulation was lacking
in many ways. Liberalization created pressure to. re-regulate in a
manner more suited to a liberalized environment, and encouraged
policymakers to rethink their approach to regulating such diverse
areas of law as financial services and products liability. As part of
economic liberalization, the legal profession itself was also gradually liberalized. The entry and increasing size of these law firms
has provided American models for regulation in a liberalized environment as well as posed a direct competitive threat to the Japanese legal establishment, helping to spark the restructuring of the
Japanese legal profession itself.
Economic liberalization alone, however, is only part of the explanation. Without the fragmentation of the Japanese political
landscape, particularly evident in the increasing political competition following the weakening of the LDP, Americanization would
be limited primarily to areas of the economy most impacted by deregulation. The fragmentation of the Japanese political landscape
has helped give voice to a more diverse group of interests, forcing
politicians to pay attention to diffuse interests such as consumer or
investor protection.
The convergence of political fragmentation and economic liberalization has led to significant changes in regulatory style along
American lines. In essence, Japan is in the process of replacing the
waning power of bureaucrats to regulate Japanese affairs in informal consultation with a business and political elite. In its place, the
legal landscape is being gradually but fundamentally altered to
empower a broader range of interests beyond this elite to play a
greater role in determining their own affairs. As we have seen,
power has been shifted from bureaucrats and businesses to con-
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sumers through the provision of strict liability, from corporate insiders to shareholders through the creation of a cause of action for
insider trading, and from entrenched management to shareholders
through facilitating the use of derivative suit.
The phenomenon is evident in other areas as well. For example, until 2000, the Japanese Fair Trade Commission had the exclusive authority to enforce the Antimonopoly Act and private parties
have been unable to seek court injunctions to prevent violations of
the Antimonopoly Act. An amendment in 2000 allowed private
parties injured by violation of the Antimonopoly Act to directly
seek court orders to prevent illegal conduct under the Act.1 46 Empowering individuals to exercise such rights is being realized
through reform of the judicial system itself to facilitate litigation
and increases in the number of legal professionals through which
147
those rights may be exercised.
The hoarding of information within closed, personal networks
within the bureaucracy (jinmyaku) and those with close access to it
is also being reduced, through the emphasis of transparency and
disclosure. Strict liability encourages detailed warnings; a regulatory shift toward disclosure is extending the range and quality of
financial information from corporate insiders to the investing public. Also, government secrets are being made available to the public through the Freedom of Information Act and other measures
such as the Administrative Procedures Act. As a result, investors,
consumers, and citizens have access to information previously only
available to a business, political, and bureaucratic elite. More generally, the discretionary power of the bureaucracy has been circumscribed through the NPO Act, reorganization of the bureaucracy, and, at least hortatively, the Public Ethics Act.
This Americanization, however, should not be overemphasized. Japanese style securities regulation, litigation, and corporate
governance are undoubtedly much more like the United States
than fifteen years ago, but substantial differences remain. Litigation has increased, but not to anywhere near the "adversarial legalism" of the United States. Statutory changes create incentives
for behavioral changes, but where constraints on institutional ca146 In addition, the amendment extended strict liability to trade associations
(jigyosha dantai)for compensation for damages resulting from illegal acts.
147 On the politics of judicial reform, see Setsuo Miyazawa, The Politics of Judicial Reform in Japan:The Rule of Law at Last?, 2 AsIAN-PAC. L. & POL'YJ. 89 (2001), at
http://www.Hawaii.edu/aplpj.
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pacity exist, fundamental change in practice will take time to more
dearly manifest itself. Most notably, the pace of Americanization
is limited by access to lawyers, and it will take many years before
increases in the number of legal professionals result in a sufficient
number of experienced lawyers that a broader range of interests
can avail themselves of formal legal representation. 148 With the
forces of economic liberalization and political fragmentation in Japan being too powerful to ignore, however, the Americanization of
the Japanese legal system will only continue.

148 In the interim, it may be that, as some observers have suggested, Japan,
particularly in the business area, will increasingly rely on U.S. professionals to fill
the gap on institutional inadequacies. The practice of accounting in Japan has already gone this way, while the legal market is showing signs of the same.
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